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THE UNDERAPPRECIATED ROLE OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT IN WILDERNESS
DESIGNATION AND MANAGEMENT
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM & LORENA M. WISEHART**

On its 50th anniversary, the Wilderness Act owes much to the effect of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), both in terms of the number
of acres in the national wilderness system and in the management of
designated wilderness areas. Courts have closely scrutinized federal land
management agency actions that threaten wilderness qualities, and this
Article maintains that the usual vehicle has been NEPA. Enacted a little over
a half-decade after the Wilderness Act, NEPA was instrumental in the
doubling of wilderness acres in the 1980s, as Congress added wilderness
areas and released other areas to multiple uses in response to a NEPA
injunction imposed on U.S. Forest Service management. NEPA has also had
a considerable effect on wilderness area management, curbing timber
cutting and recreational activities and, in combination with the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, requiring the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) to pursue the least damaging environmental alternative to rerouting a
road bisecting wilderness study areas.
NEPA’s influence on potential wilderness remains large a half-century
after the passage of the Wilderness Act, as NEPA has ratified the Forest
Service’s “Roadless Rule,” which will protect potential wilderness areas
from most developments, making them eligible for future wilderness
designation. Additionally, NEPA has required BLM to identify and publicly
disclose lands with wilderness characteristics when revising its land plans.
Thus, NEPA has fulfilled its mission of improving environmental decision
making by encouraging the designation of new wilderness areas, insisting on
careful management of existing wilderness, and approving both the
protection of large roadless areas in national forests and the identification of
roadless areas in BLM land plans. Without NEPA, there would be
considerably less to celebrate on the Wilderness Act’s 50th anniversary.

Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. Prepared
for a conference on “The Wilderness Act At 50,” April 11, 2014, at Lewis and Clark Law School.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),1 the nation’s basic
environmental charter, has often been criticized for its lack of substance.2
However, NEPA has in fact played a substantial, if overlooked, role in
fostering improved federal environmental decision making.3 A particularly
1

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006).
See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989) (“[I]t would
not have violated NEPA if the Forest Service, after complying with the Act’s procedural
prerequisites, had decided that the benefits to be derived from downhill skiing [justified
continuing the project] notwithstanding the loss of 15 percent, 50 percent, or even 100 percent
of the mule deer herd [living at the possible ski site].”); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (explaining that NEPA’s purpose is to
ensure a “fully informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily a decision the judges of
the Court of Appeals or of this Court would have reached had they been members of the
decision-making unit of the agency.”); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)
(“Neither the statute nor its legislative history contemplates that a court should substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions. The only
role for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental
consequences; it cannot ‘interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the
choice of the action to be taken.’” (citations omitted)).
3 For example, the Ninth Circuit’s NEPA jurisprudence on standing, protection of the
existing environment, the environmental significance threshold, and the scope of agency
alternatives all favor environmental outcomes. See Michael C. Blumm & Keith Mosman, The
2

Overlooked Role of the National Environmental Policy Act in Protecting the Western
Environment: NEPA in the Ninth Circuit, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 193, 197, 199 (2012)
(claiming that the Ninth Circuit has adopted four distinct lines of cases that help to fulfill the
environmental protection purpose that Congress envisioned for NEPA). One way in which
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noteworthy contribution of NEPA largely escaping widespread recognition
has been the critical role NEPA has played both in encouraging the
congressional designation of wilderness areas and in helping to ensure their
sound management. In combination with the standards and procedures of
the Wilderness Act4 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA),5 NEPA has functioned to provide protection to de facto
wilderness lands prior to official wilderness designation and to guard against
unwise developments in designated wilderness areas.
NEPA’s role in encouraging the designation of wilderness areas is
particularly noteworthy. After the Wilderness Act created some nine million
acres of “instant” wilderness in 1964,6 wilderness designations stalled amid
the statute’s cumbersome study procedures.7 However, after the Tenth
Circuit ruled in 1971 that the Wilderness Act required the Forest Service to
study unroaded lands adjacent to so-called “primitive” areas for their
wilderness potential before allowing timber harvests of those areas, NEPA
assumed a prominent role in studying the wilderness potential of these
areas.8 And after the Forest Service decided to conduct a nationwide study
of potential wilderness area through two “Roadless Area Review and
Evaluations” (RARE I and II), the Ninth Circuit stopped the agency from
allowing development on lands that it had decided not to recommend for
wilderness designation on NEPA grounds.9 This NEPA injunction effectively
ended the RARE program and induced Congress to enact a series of state
wilderness statutes that in the 1980s and early 1990s more than doubled the

NEPA has produced improved environmental decisionmaking has been through the courts’ use
of comments by agencies with environmental expertise. See Michael C. Blumm & Marla Nelson,
Pluralism and the Environment Revisited: The Role of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation,
37 VT. L. REV. 5, 7 (2012) (maintaining that comments of agencies with environmental expertise
remain quite influential in reviewing courts’ interpretations of NEPA compliance).
4 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C §§ 1131–1136 (2006 & Supp. II 2008), amended by Omnibus
Public Land Management Act of 2009 Pub. L. No. 111-11 123 Stat. 991.
5 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785 (2006).
6 16 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006) (“All areas within the national forests classified at least 30
days before September 3, 1964 by the Secretary of Agriculture or the Chief of the Forest Service
as ‘wilderness’, ‘wild’, or ‘canoe’ are hereby designated as wilderness areas.”). This provision
instantly created approximately 9.1 million acres of designated wilderness. CRAIG W. ALLIN, THE
POLITICS OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION 136 (1982).
7 See infra notes 60–67 and accompanying text (discussing the district court’s decision in
Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593, 594–95 (D. Colo. 1970) and the Tenth Circuit’s
decision in Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793, 797–98 (10th Cir. 1971), affirming the district
court).
8 See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text (discussing Wyoming Outdoor
Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 1973)); H. Michael Anderson & Aliki
Moncrief, America’s Unprotected Wilderness, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 413, 420 (1999) (“The Forest
Service responded [to Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council] by deferring development
activities in roadless areas pending compliance with NEPA.”).
9 See infra notes 105–16 and accompanying text (discussing California v. Block, 690 F.2d
753, 758, 760, 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming that the Forest Service’s EIS did not adequately
discuss the range of alternatives at the agency’s disposal or address site-specific environmental
consequences of agency action)).

Electroniccopy
copy available
available at:
Electronic
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2377142
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377142

8_TO JCI.BLUMM

326

4/22/2014 1:28 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 44:323

number of wilderness areas and added more than eight percent of the
current wilderness acreage.10
With the maturing of the wilderness system in the late 1980s, attention
shifted from wilderness designation to wilderness management. In several
decisions, courts interpreted NEPA as significantly constraining the
discretion of federal agencies in their management of wilderness areas. For
example, the D.C. District Court decided that the Forest Service could not,
consistent with NEPA, sanction wholesale timber harvesting of insectdamaged timber inside a wilderness area for the benefit of commercial
timberlands outside the wilderness.11 And the Ninth Circuit determined that
NEPA required the Forest Service to evaluate the effect of reissuing a permit
for pack-mule trips in a wilderness area on the Wilderness Act’s essential
goal of preserving wilderness character, while pursuing ancillary
recreational goals.12
Courts have also invoked NEPA to protect areas with wilderness
potential that have not attained wilderness status. For example, the Ninth
Circuit interpreted NEPA as requiring the Forest Service to evaluate the
effect of logging roadless lands not selected for wilderness designation and
to protect the congressional prerogative to designate wilderness in the
future.13 And the Tenth Circuit ruled that when approving a road

10 See infra notes 117–24 and accompanying text; see also ROSS W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 31447, WILDERNESS: OVERVIEW AND STATISTICS 2 (2010), available at http://
polis.house.gov/uploadedfiles/wildernessoverviewcrs.pdf (tabulating additions to the National
Wilderness Preservation System); Wilderness.net, Wilderness Statistics Reports,
http://www.wilderness.net/NWPS/chart (last visited Apr. 12, 2014) (summarizing amount of
wilderness designated by legislative session); Michael C. Blumm & Andrew B. Erickson, Federal
Wild Lands Policy in the Twenty-First Century: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been, 25 COLO.
NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the results of the
state wilderness bills in terms of acreage protected).
11 See infra notes 155–66 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F.
Supp. 488, 490–94 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); Sierra Club v. Lyng (Lyng I), 662 F. Supp. 40, 42–44 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (holding that the Secretary lacked:

“the same [Wilderness Act] Section 4(d)(1) broad management discretion [to manage
Wilderness Areas] . . . when he takes actions within the Wilderness Areas for the benefit
of outside commercial and other private interests, . . . because in a situation like this the
Secretary is not managing the wilderness but acting contrary to wilderness policy for the
benefit of outsiders[,]”
and continuing a preliminary injunction against Secretary’s actions until the publication of an
EIS); Sierra Club v. Lyng (Lyng II), 663 F. Supp. 556, 558, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (addressing the
extent to which a Forest Service program to combat beetle infestation in wilderness areas may
benefit privately owned commercial lands adjacent to the wilderness area).
12 See infra notes 178–87 and accompanying text (discussing High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v.
Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 641 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that renewals of existing special use
permits were not permissible categorical exclusions under NEPA, requiring instead an EA or
EIS)).
13 See infra notes 207–53 and accompanying text (discussing National Audubon Society v.
U.S. Forest Service, 4 F.3d 832, 836–37 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that Congress did not intend to
“preclude judicial review of Forest Service compliance with NEPA” in four contested timber
sales on roadless areas)); Smith v. U.S. Forest Service 33 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to consider the effect of a timber sale on a
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improvement bisecting two wilderness study areas,14 NEPA demanded that
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) not only had to examine less
damaging alternatives but also had to select the least damaging alternative it
studied.15 In these cases NEPA imposed important curbs on agency
discretion in managing both wilderness areas and lands with wilderness
potential.
NEPA has also played an important role upholding Forest Service
protection for roadless areas by ratifying the so-called “Roadless Rule”
against attacks of NEPA noncompliance by those opposed to protecting
roadless areas, demonstrating that courts interpret NEPA’s requirements
flexibly to achieve the statute’s overarching purpose of promoting
environmental protection.16 NEPA continues to promote designation of
future wilderness areas by requiring BLM to identify and publicly disclose
lands with wilderness characteristics when revising its land plan plans.17
Professor Peter Appel has shown that courts give close scrutiny to
agency actions affecting wilderness areas,18 but we think that NEPA has
been the usual vehicle for ensuring that wilderness values are not shortchanged in the administrative process. In this Article, we examine the
significant but often overlooked role NEPA has played in wilderness
protection. Part I examines the background of the Wilderness Act, relevant

5,000-acre roadless area that the agency partially inventoried and released for nonwilderness
use, but declining to require an EIS and leaving to the Forest Service the decision of “how best
to comply with NEPA and its implementing regulations”); Lands Council v. Martin, 529 F.3d
1219, 1231 (9th Cir. 2008) (clarifying that the Smith ruling “applies to roadless areas that are
either greater than 5,000 acres or of a ‘sufficient size’ within the meaning of 16 U.S.C.
§ 1131(c)”).
14 For an explanation of wilderness study areas under FLPMA § 603, see infra notes 282–83
and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 284–303 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848
F.2d 1068, 1073, 1075 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Village of Los Ranchos De
Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992) (concerning the State of Utah’s attempt to
widen a state highway adjacent to two wilderness study areas (WSAs), and BLM’s duty to
oversee such expansion in accordance with § 603(c) of FLPMA, which mandated a
nonimpairment and nondegradation standard for all third party rightholders operating on
WSAs)).
16 See infra notes 260–80 and accompanying text (discussing Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v.
Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002) and Wyoming v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,
661 F.3d 1209, 1243 (10th Cir. 2011) (both holding that the Forest Service complied with NEPA
by analyzing a reasonable range of alternatives in the 2001 Roadless Rule’s EIS)).
17 See infra notes 304–12 and accompanying text (discussing Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n
v. BLM, 531 F.3d 1114, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2008), opinion amended and superseded on denial of
reh’g, 625 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding BLM violated NEPA by failing to address
wilderness characteristics when developing a land use plan in Oregon)).
18 Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62, 110, 129 (2010)
(suggesting that courts are unusually skeptical of agency plans to develop public lands in
Wilderness Act cases, and maintaining that “courts do not act as they do in other areas of law”);
see also Peter A. Appel, Wilderness, the Courts, and the Effect of Politics on Judicial
Decisionmaking, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 277–78, 311 (2011) (arguing that courts’ prowilderness decision making is not due to any discernible political ideology, “lend[ing] support
to the hypothesis that wilderness protection taps into a deep-seated cultural love of wilderness
that transcends party politics and simple ideology”).
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provisions of the Act, and the procedures the statute established to
designate additional wilderness areas. Part II discusses the way in which
NEPA contributed to the political momentum that led to substantial
expansion of the National Wilderness Preservation System in the 1980s. Part
III turns to NEPA’s role in authorizing federal courts to scrutinize closely the
management of designated wilderness areas. Part IV shows how NEPA
challenges have successfully protected potential wilderness against both
BLM and Forest Service development plans. We conclude that NEPA has
played a significant, if underappreciated, role in encouraging wilderness
designation and in ensuring that both wilderness areas and lands with
wilderness characteristics are preserved as the “untrammeled areas” that
Congress envisioned in the Wilderness Act a half-century ago.19
II. BACKGROUND
The Wilderness Act is a legacy of conservation policies of key U.S.
Forest Service administrators during the early twentieth century. Legendary
figures like Aldo Leopold and Bob Marshall forged policies preserving
natural areas as alternatives to the utilitarianism advocated by the first chief
of the Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot.20 By World War II, the Forest Service
had an established system of protecting roadless lands from development.21
But in the 1950s, a nascent environmental community began to lobby
Congress for more permanent, statutory protection for these areas.22 After
nearly a decade of consideration, Congress finally passed the Wilderness Act
in 1964 giving statutory protection for “primitive areas” that the Forest
Service had managed as wilderness since the 1920s.23 The 1964 Act required
the Forest Service to study these primitive areas and pass on
recommendations to the President, who in turn would recommend which
areas were suitable for wilderness designation by Congress.24 This statutory
study requirement would lead to the first Wilderness Act lawsuits, the
results of which constrained the agency’s ability to manage the national
forests and set the stage for future litigation involving not only the
Wilderness Act but NEPA as well.25

19 See Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006) (“A wilderness, in contrast with those
areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area
where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a
visitor who does not remain.”).
20 See infra notes 26–31 and accompanying text; see also Aldo Leopold, The Wilderness and
Its Place in Forest Recreational Policy, 19 J. FORESTRY 718, 719 (1921) (explaining that
wilderness should be “kept devoid of roads, artificial trails, cottages, or other works of man”);
Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land Management in the Twenty-First Century: From Wise Use to Wise
Stewardship, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 357–58 (1994) (noting that Pinchot advocated
multiple-use and utilitarian policies while strongly opposing “the preservation view”).
21 ALLIN, supra note 6, at 81–83, 85, 94.
22 Id. at 104–05.
23 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (2006); ALLIN, supra note 6, at 105, 135–36.
24 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (2006).
25 See infra notes 75–116 and accompanying text.
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A. Wilderness Preservation Before the Wilderness Act
Support for wilderness preservation rose as an antidote to the
utilitarian land management policies Gifford Pinchot and his successors
advocated.26 Forest Service ranger Aldo Leopold spent the 1920s advancing a
national forest model that included lands reserved from economic
development.27 The post-Pinchot Forest Service eventually agreed: By 1929,
the agency had designated some five million acres of roadless national
forests as “primitive areas” that would be managed for recreational and
educational benefits.28 Leopold’s associate Bob Marshall,29 chief of the Forest

26

Pinchot headed the Department of Agriculture’s Division of Forestry beginning in 1898.

See Hardt, supra note 20, at 355. His influence as architect of modern forestry practices on
federal lands grew when he convinced his close friend President Theodore Roosevelt to transfer
control of the national forest system, which began under the authority of the General Revision
Act of 1891, from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture. See General
Revision Act of 1891, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1925) (authorizing the President to “set apart and
reserve . . . any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth,
whether of commercial value or not, as national forests”); see also M. NELSON MCGEARY,
GIFFORD PINCHOT: FORESTER-POLITICIAN 45, 54–61 (1960) (recounting the history of the
Roosevelt-Pinchot friendship and Pinchot’s political struggle to obtain management authority
over the nation’s forests); HAROLD K. STEEN, THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: A HISTORY 70, 74 (1976)
(describing the friendship between Roosevelt and Pinchot and the transfer of the forest
reserves to the Department of Agriculture). After the 1905 transfer, which gave Pinchot the
opportunity to manage vast lands and practice the silvicultural theories he had developed, he
established the principle of “sustained yield management,” which meant that the forest reserves
would be managed for the benefit of agricultural, livestock, lumbering, and mining interests. See
Hardt, supra note 20, at 355–56. This policy initially left out recreation and wilderness
preservation as agency goals, although Pinchot encouraged preservation “only as will insure the
permanence of the [forest] resources.” Id. at 356; Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The
Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140, 165 (1999) (explaining that the BLM and
Forest Service moved slowly in incorporating preservation and recreation into their
management philosophies, stating: “Gifford Pinchot . . . gave scarce recognition to recreation,
and for many years, the Forest Service deemed its primary responsibility to be the harvesting of
the timber.”).
27 See, e.g., Aldo Leopold, The Wilderness and Its Place in Forest Recreational Policy, 19 J.
FORESTRY 718, 719 (1921) (“[Such tracts should be] kept devoid of roads, artificial trails,
cottages, or other works of man.”).
28 U.S. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. L-20 REGULATIONS (1929) (internal document)
(“The Chief of the Forest Service shall determine, define, and permanently record . . . a series of
areas to be known as primitive areas, and within which shall be maintained primitive conditions
of environment, transportation, habitation, and subsistence, with a view to conserving the value
of such areas for purposes of public education, and recreation.”); JOHN B. LOOMIS, INTEGRATED
PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS TO NATIONAL FORESTS, PARKS, WILDLIFE
REFUGES, AND BLM LANDS 37 (2d ed. 2002) (illustrating that Regulation L-20 was problematic
because foresters had the authority to make “primitive” designations at the regional level,
devoid of formal oversight, leading local and regional foresters to develop idiosyncratic notions
of what “primitive” entailed, in both its geographic and temporal scope); Michael P. McClaran,
Livestock in Wilderness: A Review and Forecast, 20 ENVTL. L. 857, 861–62 (1990) (noting that
“primitive areas” remained open to certain economic activities, particularly grazing, mining, and
some timber harvesting); Amy Rashkin et al., The Wilderness Act of 1964: A Practitioner’s
Guide, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 219, 226 (2001) (beginning in 1924, the Forest Service
designated areas for preservation management as wild (roadless area less than 100,000 acres),
wilderness (roadless area greater than 100,000 acres), canoe (Boundary Waters Canoe Area in
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Service’s Division of Recreation, instituted the U-Regulations of 1939,30
authorizing the Forest Service to designate all primitive areas as either
“wilderness,” “wild,” or “recreation” areas, to greater insulate them from
development.31 For wilderness advocates, however, these initiatives shared a
common flaw: The agency’s administrative designations could not
permanently insulate such areas from economic exploitation because such
areas could always be administratively redesignated for development.32
In the 1940s and 1950s, Forest Service actions illustrated the
impermanence of these administrative wilderness designations, as the
agency reopened large tracts of administrative wilderness across the West to
economic activity, including the Gila Wilderness that Aldo Leopold had

Minnesota), or primitive (area that may be classified as wild or wilderness pending a Forest
Service inventory to determine boundaries and defining characteristics)).
29 Leopold and Marshall, along with Robert Sterling Yard, Benton MacKaye, Ernest
Oberholtzer, Bernard Frank, Harvey Broome, and Harold Clinton Anderson, founded The
Wilderness Society in 1935. THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, THE WILDERNESS ACT HANDBOOK: 40TH
ANNIVERSARY EDITION 1–2 (Ben Beach et al. eds. 2004), available at http://wilderness.org/
sites/default/files/Wilderness-Act-Handbook-2004-complete.pdf; see also PAUL S. SUTTER, DRIVEN
WILD 3–6 (2002) (discussing the history behind the formation of the Wilderness Society).
30 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.20–251.22 (1960) (superseded); Robert Marshall, The Problem of the
Wilderness, 30 SCI. MONTHLY, 141, 141 (1930), available at http://www.uvm.edu/rsenr/rm240/
marshall.pdf (discussing Leopold’s idea of government-owned undeveloped lands, Marshall
wrote, “I shall use the word wilderness to denote a region which contains no permanent
inhabitants, possesses no possibility of conveyance by any mechanical means and is sufficiently
spacious that person in crossing it must have the experience of sleeping out. The dominant
attributes of such an area are: first, that it requires anyone who exists in it to depend exclusively
on his own effort for survival; and second, that it preserves as nearly as possible the primitive
environment. This means that all roads, power transportation and settlements are barred. But
trails and temporary shelters, which were common long before the advent of the white race, are
entirely permissible.”).
31 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.20–251.22 (1960) (superseded) (“Upon recommendation of the Chief,
Forest Service national lands in single tracts of not less than 100,000 acres may be designated
by the Secretary as ‘wilderness areas’ within which there shall be no roads or other provisions
for motorized transportation, no commercial timber cutting, and no occupancy under special
use permit for hotels, stores, resorts, summer homes, or organized camps, hunting or fishing
lodges, or similar uses . . . . Suitable areas of national forest land in single tracts of less than
100,000 acres but not less than 5,000 acres may be designated by the chief of the Forest Service
as ‘wild areas,’ which shall be administered in the same manner as wilderness areas, with the
same restrictions upon their use.”); Thomas M. Rickart, Wilderness Land Preservation: The
Uneasy Reconciliation of Multiple and Single Use Land Management Policies, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 873, 878 (1980) (explaining that “[t]here was no statutory basis for the Forest Service’s
designation of “primitive” areas, and thus the agency could at its discretion modify or even
retract a protective designation by simple administrative order”).
32 McClaran, supra note 28, at 863 n.31 (“[B]y 1952, 13 years after the enactment of the URegulations, only 26% of all possible reclassifications had occurred; only six of 28 L-20 primitive
areas exceeding 100,000 acres were reclassified to U-1 wilderness status, and only 13 of 46 L-20
primitive areas less than 100,000 acres were reclassified to U-2 wild areas.”). The L-20 “primitive
area” designation provided limited protection, allowing timber harvesting, grazing, and mining
to continue. Sandra Zellmer, The Roadless Area Controversy: Past, Present, and Future, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FORTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE 21-1, 21-5
(2002); Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the
National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1, 339 n.1825 (1985).
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fought to preserve.33 Uncertainties about the security of administrative
wilderness set the tone for wilderness advocacy following World War II.
Howard Zahniser of the Wilderness Society spearheaded this movement,
arguing for permanent wilderness designated by Congress that the Forest
Service could not revoke.34
Zahniser’s efforts gained political traction by the late 1950s,35 but the
Forest Service pushback was equally intense,36 forcing a congressional
compromise that produced the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960
(MUSYA).37 MUSYA broadened the statutory authority of the Forest Service
beyond its Organic Act,38 authorizing not only sustained yield management

33 GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES LAW 1010–11 (6th ed.
2007) (mentioning three incidents where the federal government revoked administrative
wilderness status: the Gila Wilderness, Oregon’s French Pete Valley, and the Echo Park Dam
along the Utah-Colorado border, all of which involved logging concessions to timber
companies).
34 Id. Zahniser’s proposed bill described wilderness as “untrammeled by man,” or “not
subject to human controls and manipulations that hamper the free play of natural forces.” See
Gordon Steinhoff, Interpreting the Wilderness Act of 1964, 17 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 492,
498–99 (2010) (discussing Zahniser’s part in the statutory definition of “wilderness”). For
Zahniser’s general philosophy, see Howard Zahniser, How Much Wilderness Can We Afford to
Lose?, SIERRA CLUB BULL. 7–8 (Apr. 1951) (explaining Zahniser’s motivation for seeking
congressional action).
35 Senator Hubert Humphrey introduced the first wilderness bill into Congress in 1956,
although it languished in committee. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1011.
36 ALLIN, supra note 6, at 111 (“The general view of the Forest Service, as enunciated by its
chief, Richard E. McArdle, was that ‘the bill would strike at the heart of the multiple-use policy
of National Forest administration.’”). Concerned about loss of agency discretion as well as
timber, power, and mining interests, the Service initially opposed the bill that would become the
Wilderness Act. Zellmer, supra note 32, at 21-6; see also Rickart, supra note 31, at 879
(explaining that the Forest Service viewed wilderness legislation as a threat to founding
principles of national forest management and that the agency feared wilderness would be given
priority where nonwilderness uses of forest resources might better serve the public need).
The fight over wilderness was only one of the postwar disputes that the Forest Service
faced. The timber industry exerted equally strong pressure to increase the yield from national
forests as a response to the postwar housing boom. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 32,
at 28 (explaining that forest planning became more controversial as the demand for timber and
other resources increased in the 1950s). The burgeoning American middle class also sought
unprecedented recreational access to federal lands. Id. at 28–29 (stating that during the same
time timber demand increased, annual recreational visits to national forests increased from 26
to 81.5 million). The Forest Service had to confront these challenges guided by nothing but its
own Organic Act, which identified watershed protection and timber production as the agency’s
principal duties in managing the national forest system. See Organic Administration Act of 1897,
16 U.S.C. §§ 473–78, 479–82, 551, (2006); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707 (1978)
(interpreting the legislative intent behind the Organic Act to reserve the national forests for the
primary purposes of “conserv[ing] water flows” and providing a “continuous supply of timber
for the people”). These stakeholders sought to advance the kind of single-use doctrine that the
Forest Service had long tried to avoid. See Hardt, supra note 20, at 355–56 (describing the
multiple use and sustained yield management theories implemented by Pinchot).
37 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–531 (2006).
38 Id. § 475 (the pertinent language reads, “[national forests shall be established] for the
purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States . . .”). The Forest Service in
fact had been practicing multiple use for years before this statutory codification. DENNIS ROTH &
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and watershed preservation, but also fostering recreation, grazing, and
wildlife as coequal resources.39 Timber interests believed MUSYA protected
sustained yield of commodity production; environmentalists cautiously
approved the attention to wildlife; and the general public ostensibly
benefited from increased recreation opportunities.40 However, MUSYA was
only a half-measure for wilderness, since the statute announced that the
agency could construe wilderness as a permissible use of the national
forests, but did not make it a mandatory one.41
In 1964, after nine years of debate, Congress enacted the Wilderness
Act, originally drafted by Zahniser.42 Like MUSYA, it was a legislative
compromise. The Senate passed a wilderness bill in 1961, but the House bill
was blocked by the Chairman of Interior and Insular Affairs Committee,
Wayne Aspinall of Colorado.43 Aspinall, who saw the wilderness movement
as a direct threat to natural resource industries, refused to release the bill
from his committee until his concerns were addressed.44
Wilderness supporters ultimately persuaded Aspinall by agreeing to
support a number of his own legislative projects, most notably the Public
Land Law Review Commission Act (PLLRC Act).45 Aspinall designed the
FRANK HARMON, U.S. FOREST SERV., FS-574, FOREST SERVICE HISTORY SERIES: THE FOREST SERVICE
IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL ERA 1 (1995). For example, in the Oregon and California Lands Act of
1937, 43 U.S.C. § 1181a (2006), Congress authorized the sustained yield management of forest
lands that had been the subject of a failed railroad grant. See Michael C. Blumm & Tim
Wigington, The Oregon and California Railroad Grant Lands’ Sordid Past, Contentious Present,
and Uncertain Future: A Century of Conflict, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1–8, 20–21 (2013).
39 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2006).
40 Hardt, supra note 20, at 365.
41 16 U.S.C. § 529 (2006) (stating that “[t]he establishment and maintenance of areas of
wilderness are consistent with the purposes [of MUSYA]”).
42 THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, supra note 29, at 2.
43 Aspinall authored an alternative version of the wilderness bill that wilderness advocates
described as “perversion of the wilderness preservation legislation.” The Speaker of the House
refused to schedule Aspinall’s bill to enter the House floor for debate; Aspinall retaliated by
refusing to let the Senate bill leave his committee. DOUG SCOTT, THE ENDURING WILDERNESS:
PROTECTING OUR NATURAL HERITAGE THROUGH THE WILDERNESS ACT 54 (2004); see, e.g., COGGINS
ET AL., supra note 33, at 1011; 3 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC
NATURAL RESOURCES LAw § 25:9 (2d ed. 2013).
44 See Dennis Roth, The National Forests and the Campaign for Wilderness Legislation, 28
J. FOREST HIST. 112, 124 (1984) (explaining that the wilderness bill was stalled for three years in
the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs as Chairman Aspinall “maneuvered to
incorporate congressional affirmative action and the continuation of mining”); James Morton
Turner, “The Specter of Environmentalism”: Wilderness, Environmental Politics, and the
Evolution of the New Right, 96 J. AM. HIST. 123, 127 (2009) (describing Aspinall as “the
legislation’s most dogged opponent” and explaining that “Aspinall carefully guarded the West’s
ability to develop its natural resources; as chair of the House Interior Committee with oversight
of the public lands, he was in a powerful position to do so.”); see also CRAIG W. ALLIN,
WILDERNESS POLICY, in WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 176 (Charles Davis
ed., 1997) (describing Aspinall’s “antiwilderness agenda”).
45 The Public Land Law Review Commission Act of 1964, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1391–1400 (1964).
Aspinall was also instrumental in the enactment of the Classification and Multiple Use Act of
1964, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411–1418 (1964) (authorizing the development of multiple-use plans for
lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management); and the Public Land Sale Act of 1964, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1421–1427 (1964) (authorizing sales of public lands in tracts not exceeding 5,120 acres,
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commission as a means to secure industry access to federal lands through
the conduct of “a complete review of all the laws and regulations affecting
Federal public land ownership and the natural resources thereof.”46 Before it
disbanded in 1970, the PLLRC Act completed a massive report to Congress,47
but its chief recommendation—replacing multiple use doctrine with
dominant use doctrine—was never implemented.48 Still, the PLLRC Act had
two lasting effects: 1) its land planning prescriptions for the BLM formed the

that have been classified for sale in accordance with a “determination that (a) the lands are
required for the orderly growth and development of a community or (b) the lands are chiefly
valuable for residential, commercial, agricultural (exclusive of lands chiefly valuable for grazing
or raising forage crops), industrial, or public uses or development.”)). See Perry R. Hagenstein,
Commissions and Public Land Policies: Setting the Stage for Change, 54 DENV. L. J., 619, 630
(1977) (describing Aspinall’s reaction to the rising wilderness sentiment in administrative
agencies as follows: “Responding to a growing national interest in recreation and preservation
of natural values on public lands, the administrative agencies . . . were increasingly restricting
economic uses of these lands. These uses . . . had strong local constituencies from which
western members of Congress derived much of their support and which provided grist for the
legislative mills of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committees. At least some members of the
Interior Committees realized that they were unable to slow the administrative agencies against
which they were arrayed and which had the discretionary authority ultimately to bring
economic uses of the public lands to a halt. As Chairman of the House Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee, Aspinall was looking for a way to place some of the control over public land
decisions back in the Congress and especially in his Committee.”).
46 H. COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., PUBLIC LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION: BACKGROUND AND NEED 39, 41 (1964) (prepared by Wayne Aspinall). The
structure of the PLLRC heavily favored congressional control: Its members included six
senators, six congressmen, six presidential appointees, and a chairman selected by the
Commission, who turned out to be Aspinall. See Jerome C. Muys, The Public Land Law Review
Commission’s Impact on the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REV.
301, 302 (1979).
47 The PLLRC study produced 33 separate reports on public land issues, based on over 900
witness testimonies, nationwide public land tours for PLLRC members, and extensive advice
from employees of state and federal government. See, e.g., Jerome C. Muys, The Unfinished
Agenda of the Public Land Law Review Commission, in PUBLIC LAND LAW 315 (1992); Muys,
supra note 46, at 302.
48 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND 3 (1970)
(doubting the practicality of “multiple-use” doctrine, the PLLRC’s final report advocated a
“dominant use” policy for public lands: “[W]here a unit, within an area managed for many uses,
can contribute maximum benefit through one particular use, that use should be recognized as
the dominant use, and the land should be managed to avoid interference with fulfillment of such
dominant use.”); see also SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY:
ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 235 (2d ed. 1980) (commenting on the effect of the final
PLLRC report: “[T]here was a brief cry of horror from most conservationists and
preservationists, and then silence. It was unnecessary to criticize the report or to elaborate its
themes because the recommendations were being ignored by almost everyone.”). The size and
scope of the PLLRC also proved alienating to potential stakeholders, all of whom had something
to lose from the prescription of dominant use. As Jerry Muys, former counsel to the PLLRC,
stated, “The PLLRC report . . . covered the full range of uses of the public lands . . . .
Consequently, no single interest group, including the affected federal land management
agencies, would be completely pleased with the report. . . . In short, too many oxen were gored
to be able to muster something like a Citizens Committee for the PLLRC Report.” Muys, supra
note 46, at 302–03.
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basis of FLPMA, enacted six years later,49 and 2) the commission’s creation
persuaded Aspinall to support the Wilderness Act, which paved the way for
its enactment.

B. Examining the Wilderness Act
Signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson fifty years ago, on
September 3, 1964,50 the Wilderness Act contains unusually poetic language
in its description of wilderness:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works
dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and
its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor
51
who does not remain.

The Act defines wilderness areas as undeveloped tracts of federal land
that 1) generally appear to have been affected by the forces of nature (as
opposed to human development); 2) possess outstanding opportunities for
solitude or primitive and unconfined types of recreation; 3) have at least
5,000 acres of land or can otherwise be practically sustained in an
unimpaired condition; and 4) may also contain ecological, geological, or
other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.52
Congress stipulated that wilderness areas would be “devoted [only] to the
public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation,
and historical use,”53 in contrast to the discretionary public land laws that
preceded wilderness designation.54
The Act created 9.1 million acres of so-called “instant wilderness” from
lands that were previously classified as “wild” or “wilderness” under the
agency’s U-Regulations of 1939.55 Congress also ordered the Forest Service
to study the remaining 5.5 million acres of primitive areas designated by its
L-Regulations of 1929, but which had not been designated under the Uregulations, and to assess their suitability for inclusion in the National
Wilderness System (NWS).56 The Act likewise directed the Secretary of the
49 See Muys, supra note 46, at 306; infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (regarding
FLPMA and BLM’s mandate to conduct a study of public lands for either inclusion in or
exclusion from the NWS).
50 Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131–1136 (2006).
51 Id. § 1131(c).
52
53
54

Id.
Id. § 1133(b).
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

55 16 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006) (“All areas within the national forests classified at least 30
days before September 3, 1964 by the Secretary of Agriculture of the Chief of the Forest Service
as ‘wilderness’, ‘wild’, or ‘canoe’ are hereby designated as wilderness areas.”). This
administrative wilderness was comprised of 54 separate areas. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note
33, at 1011; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1538, at 8 (1964) (giving an itemized list of the total size of all areas
included as “instant wilderness”).
56 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (2006); see also Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its
Background and Meaning, 45 OR. L. REV. 288–89 (1966).
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Interior to conduct a wilderness suitability study of all roadless areas over
5,000 acres in size within the National Wildlife Refuge and the National Park
Systems.57 The agencies had ten years to complete these studies and present
their findings to the President, who would then pass on his
recommendations to Congress for inclusion in or exclusion from the
National Wilderness System.58 The Forest Service was expressly obligated to
manage the primitive areas under study as wilderness, free of development,
until the studies were complete and Congress took action.59
In 1970, in the first major court suit under the Wilderness Act,
conservation organizations and neighboring landowners sought to enjoin the
Forest Service from selling timber from the East Meadow Creek area of
White River National Forest in Colorado.60 The plaintiffs in Parker v. United
States alleged the area was “of such character as to qualify as wilderness,”
and claimed that selling timber on such land would violate both the
Wilderness Act and Forest Service regulations.61
The East Meadow Creek area was contiguous to a designated “primitive
area” and had not been studied by the Forest Service during the RARE I
analysis.62 The Parker plaintiffs alleged the Forest Service was obligated to
study the area and make a recommendation as to its wilderness potential
prior to authorizing any activities that would irreparably harm the area’s
wilderness character.63
The Tenth Circuit, affirming the district court, concluded that timber
harvesting would destroy the presidential and congressional options to
designate the area as wilderness.64 The court therefore upheld the lower
court’s injunction preventing the Secretary of Agriculture from authorizing
timber harvesting on undeveloped land contiguous to a designated “primitive
area,” because the President and Congress had yet to consider whether to
designate the land as wilderness.65 The Parker result established a practice
of strict judicial scrutiny of agency decisions that could affect wilderness
values and limited the discretion of the Forest Service to approve
developments like timber harvesting or road building affecting potential
wilderness areas.66 Following Parker, the Forest Service had to study
57

16 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (2006).
Id. § 1132(b) (establishing the primacy of Congress in creating wilderness, specifying:
“Each recommendation of the President for designation as ‘wilderness’ shall become effective
only if so provided by an Act of Congress.”).
59 Id. (“[A]reas classified as ‘primitive’ on September 3, 1964 shall continue to be
administered under the rules and regulations affecting such areas on September 3, 1964 until
Congress has determined otherwise.”).
60 Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593, 594 (D. Colo. 1970), aff’d, 448 F.2d 793 (10th
Cir. 1971).
61 309 F. Supp. at 594.
58

62

Id.
Id. at 594–95.
64 See Parker, 448 F.2d at 797–98; COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43, § 25:9.
65 See Parker, 448 F.2d at 797–98.
66 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1049; see also H. Anthony Ruckel, The Wilderness Act
and the Courts, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 611, 614 (1999) (viewing the directive in section 3(b) of the
63

Act as an order to federal land agencies to “proceed slowly”).
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primitive areas and areas contiguous to primitive areas, make
recommendations to the President about their wilderness suitability, and
preserve the wilderness character of the areas pending final determination
on wilderness status by Congress.67 The latter requirement gave substantial
interim protection to wilderness-like areas of national forests.
At the time of the Parker litigation, the Forest Service was undertaking
a massive inventory and study of potential wilderness areas. And it would be
NEPA, not the Wilderness Act, which wilderness preservationists would
look to in order to safeguard the nation’s untrammeled areas.

C. The Roadless Area Review Evaluation (RARE) and Its Challenges
Although this fact is often overlooked, the Wilderness Act did not
address roadless areas in the National Forest System not already classified
as wilderness or primitive areas or areas adjacent to such lands.68 However,
in 1967, Forest Service Chief Edward Cliff decided to undertake what
became known as the Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE, later
called RARE I), a process of inventorying and studying all roadless areas

67 ALLIN, supra note 6, at 154–55. Courts have ruled that section 1782 of FLPMA “essentially
codifies and extends the Parker rule for WSAs on BLM public lands.” COGGINS & GLICKSMAN,
supra note 43, § 25:16. Although Parker indicated that section 3(b) of the Wilderness Act
restricted the Secretary’s discretion to approve development of wilderness land contiguous to a
designated area, in Wilson v. Block the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to extend that
restriction to roadless lands not contiguous to a primitive area. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d
735, 752–53 (10th Cir. 1983). In Wilson, environmental groups challenged the Forest Service’s
decision to authorize expansion of a ski area in Arizona’s Coconino National Forest. Id. at 738–
39. The plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary impermissibly approved the development of
“pristine land” adjacent to lands the President recommended be designated as wilderness,
because this infringed Congress’s prerogative to designate wilderness areas and determine their
boundaries. Id. at 751. However, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that
the Forest Service did not violate the Wilderness Act, even though the proposed ski area
expansion abutted lands that the Forest Service and the President had recommended for
preservation as wilderness. Id. at 739, 751, 753. The court distinguished Parker, explaining that
section 3(b) of the Wilderness Act only restricted the Secretary’s discretion to develop
wilderness land contiguous to a designated primitive area; it did not apply to lands that are
“neither contained in nor contiguous to a primitive area,” and none of the lands at issue in
Wilson were designated “primitive.” Id. at 752–53.
68 Wilson, 708 F.2d at 752–53; see also DOUGLAS SCOTT, A WILDERNESS-FOREVER FUTURE: A
SHORT HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL WILDERNESS PRESERVATION SYSTEM II.C17 (2001), available at
http://wilderness.nps.gov/celebrate/Section_Two/NWPS%20History.pdf (mentioning that “[t]he
5,000,000 acres of 1930s-era national forest primitive areas for which the Wilderness Act
required study were certainly not the only wilderness-quality lands on the national forests. . . .
[T]here were many other undeveloped areas—what came to be called the de facto wilderness
and, later, roadless areas—meriting preservation . . . .”); H. Michael Anderson & Aliki Moncrief,
America’s Unprotected Wilderness, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 413, 419 (1999) (explaining that the
Wilderness Act did not “specify a process for ongoing administrative or public review of
potential wilderness, beyond the ten-year studies of national forest primitive areas and of
national park and wildlife refuge roadless areas. . . . [and t]he Act entirely omitted two major
types of potential wilderness from the review process: (1) national forest roadless areas that
were not classified as primitive areas and (2) all roadless areas administered by the BLM.”).
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greater than 5,000 acres, not just designated primitive areas.69 Based on the
recommendations of regional foresters,70 RARE I proceeded to study some
fifty-six million acres of roadless areas in the National Forest System and to
assess their suitability for wilderness designation.71
When concluded in 1972, the RARE I study 1) recommended twelve
million acres—about 20% of the inventoried lands—for wilderness
designation; 2) set aside an additional eleven million acres for further
review; and 3) proposed “releasing” the remaining thirty-three million
acres—roughly 60% of inventoried lands—for multiple-use management.72
The agency preserved both the twelve million acres of recommended
wilderness and the eleven million acres of designated “study areas” until
Congress made a final decision as to their wilderness suitability.73 However,
the Forest Service would make the remaining thirty-three million roadless
acres available for developments like timber harvesting and road building.
The results of RARE I and its successor studies would haunt the Forest
Service for decades, largely due to the effects of NEPA.74
III. NEPA’S ROLE IN EXPANDING THE WILDERNESS SYSTEM
Although Congress did not enact NEPA until a half-decade after the
passage of the Wilderness Act,75 the nation’s basic environmental charter

69 See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43, § 25:9; Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 32, at
345 n.1857 (“The roadless area study was originally recommended by a 4-person team appointed
to draft policy guidelines to implement the Wilderness Act.”). In late 1964, the team advised
forest supervisors to “review each National Forest and identify, but not formally designate in
any way, all potential new wilderness.” JOHN C. HENDEE ET AL., U.S. FOREST SERV., MISC. PUBL’N
NO. 1365, WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT 99 (1978); see also ALLIN, supra note 6, at 159–60
(suggesting that the roadless area inventory may have been the result of a compromise with the
White House which was pressuring the Forest Service to adopt the wilderness character
standard of section 2(c) of the Act in favor of the “purity principle,” a stricter approach
advocated by the agency).
70 See Rickart, supra note 31, at 886 (stating “[t]he first step in the RARE process required a
determination by Regional Foresters of which roadless, undeveloped areas within their regions
should be studied for possible wilderness designation.”); U.S. FOREST SERV., ROADLESS AND
UNDEVELOPED AREAS DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT 11–12 (1973) (calling for “[selecting]
high-quality areas for additional study and to continue to protect their wilderness resource
characteristics until a final determination can be made.”).
71 U.S. FOREST SERV., supra note 70, at a-iii; COGGINS & GLICKMAN, supra note 43, § 25:9
(noting that the RARE I inventory identified more than 56 million acres of national forest land
that “technically qualified as wilderness”); Sandra Zellmer, A Preservation Paradox: Political
Prestidigitation and an Enduring Resource of Wildness, 34 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1044 (2004); see also
ALLIN, supra note 6, at 160 (characterizing RARE I as “more quick than comprehensive” because
the entire review was conducted in just a year); see generally Richard Bury & Gary Lapotka,
The Making of Wilderness: Land Use and the National Forest System, ENV’T, Dec. 1979, at 12,
14–15 (discussing RARE I’s assessment process).
72 See Bury & Lapotka, supra note 71, at 12.
73
74
75

Id.
See infra Part III.A–B.
See Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964); National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
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played a critical role in expanding the wilderness system.76 Most of the
wilderness areas initially designated by the Wilderness Act consisted of
“rock and ice” areas, leaving large tracts of lower elevation lands with timber
and mineral resources vulnerable to development.77 As advocates of
wilderness preservation pushed for expanding the Wilderness Preservation
System to include areas beyond the rocks and ice, NEPA proved to be an
essential mechanism, by involving both the public and the courts in these
efforts.78 NEPA in fact became the primary vehicle for challenges to Forest
Service wilderness recommendations and attempted releases of wildernesseligible lands to multiple use management.79 The ability to obtain judicial
review of the Forest Service’s wilderness decisions under NEPA was
essential, since the RARE study was not required by, and therefore could not
be challenged under the Wilderness Act.80 As the Forest Service had great
difficulty in complying with NEPA in the RARE process, the statute proved
indispensable in preserving roadless areas until Congress intervened in the
1980s by enacting a series of state-specific wilderness bills.81

A. Early NEPA Cases Affecting the Wilderness Designation Process
RARE I was the Forest Service’s first attempt to develop a procedure
for allocating roadless areas to wilderness preservation. The study aimed to
facilitate resource planning and provide certainty as to which lands should
be designated as wilderness, and which could be released for other uses.82
Wilderness preservation advocates criticized RARE I for recommending for
wilderness only a fraction of roadless areas it studied,83 and environmental
groups seized upon NEPA to challenge the RARE I allocations.84 The first of
these suits, Sierra Club v. Butz,85 ended Forest Service hopes that RARE I

76
77

See infra notes 83–116 and accompanying text.
See GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 1128–29 (5th

ed. 2002) (describing the “wilderness areas designated in the Wilderness Act or shortly
thereafter [as] so-called ‘rocks and ice’ areas—high altitude, remote, relatively inaccessible and
with few known resources of demand in the marketplace like timber and minerals”).
78 See infra notes 83–116 and accompanying text.
79 See infra Part III.A–B; COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1049.
80 See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1049.
81 See infra Part III.C.
82 ALLIN, supra note 6, at 160; Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 32, at 346.
83 See infra text accompanying notes 85–86.
84 JOHN C. HENDEE & CHAD P. DAWSON, WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT: STEWARDSHIP AND
PROTECTION OF RESOURCES AND VALUES 132 (3d ed. 2002) (explaining that critics of RARE I
alleged the review was intentionally fast, so as to thwart “[o]pportunities for careful review
by . . . agency personnel and concerned citizens,” and the methodology utilized by the Forest
Service was inadequate). Id. See discussion of NEPA, infra Part IV; see also ALLIN, supra note 6,
at 160 (explaining that “RARE I proved to be more quick than comprehensive”). Congress
passed NEPA in 1969 and RARE I was completed in 1972, meaning that NEPA was available to
support challenges to RARE I allocation decisions.
85 Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F.Supp. 934, N.D. Cal. (1972). 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
20,071 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1972).
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would justify the development of those areas that it recommended be
dropped from wilderness consideration.86
In Butz, the Sierra Club successfully argued that NEPA required the
Forest Service to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) prior to
authorizing timber sales in roadless areas that the RARE study inventoried
but designated as nonwilderness.87 The Sierra Club sued, claiming that the
proposed timber sales violated NEPA.88 The Forest Service responded by
arguing that NEPA did not apply because RARE I was a voluntary study not
required by the Wilderness Act, and consequently authorizing development
in the inventoried roadless areas was a “nondecision,” not an agency
“action” subject to NEPA.89 The district court agreed with the conservation
groups and ruled that NEPA required preparation of an EIS before the
Forest Service could authorize timber sales threatening the wilderness
character of lands meeting the qualifications for wilderness.90
The Sierra Club injunction made clear that each new development
proposal on inventoried national forest lands—representing unique natural
resources—required preparation of an EIS that would consider and publicly
disclose the wilderness values of the lands under consideration.91 This case
was NEPA’s first, but certainly not the final blow to Forest Service attempts
to permanently free up roadless areas for development.
Shortly after Sierra Club v. Butz, environmental groups again succeeded
in using NEPA to stop development of RARE I inventoried lands.92 In
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, environmentalists sued the
Forest Service for failing to prepare EISs on timber sales planned prior to
completion of RARE I.93 The Forest Service claimed that NEPA did not

86
87

Rickart, supra note 31, at 890; see infra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 32, at 347; Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) at

20,072.
88

Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) at 20,072.
Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 32, at 347 n.1868
90 Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. Law Inst.) at 20,072. The court’s injunction prevented the
Forest Service from authorizing any development on RARE I lands absent NEPA compliance.
89

Id.
91 See id.; Rickart, supra note 31, at 890 (“NEPA was judged applicable to all phases of the
RARE process and even initial determinations of suitability required environmental impact
statements.”); ALLIN, supra note 6, at 161.
92 See Wyo. Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz (Wyo. Outdoor Council), 484 F.2d 1244
(10th Cir. 1973), overruled on other grounds by Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh (Los
Ranchos), 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the appropriate standard for reviewing the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ determination that bridge construction project did not require an
EIS was arbitrary and capricious under the Administration Procedure Act). In Los Ranchos, the
Tenth Circuit overruled Wyo. Outdoor Council with respect to the standard of review that
should apply in NEPA cases. Los Ranchos, 956 F.2d at 973. In Wyo. Outdoor Council and others,
the Tenth Circuit applied a “reasonableness standard;” but in Los Ranchos, the court
determined this standard was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh v.
Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 385 (1989), and consequently ruled that the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard was the proper standard to apply when reviewing an agency
decision whether to prepare an EIS. Id.
93 Wyo. Outdoor Council, 484 F.2d at 1246. See also id. at 1247 (explaining that Forest
Service prepared “Environmental Impact Reviews” for the timber sales, but that the agency
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require the preparation of an EIS on any of the sales because they were not
“major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment,” the statutory trigger for an EIS.94
The district court agreed with the Forest Service, but the Tenth Circuit
reversed, determining that NEPA required preparation of an EIS on the
timber sales.95 Adopting the reasoning of Sierra Club v. Butz, the court ruled
that NEPA procedures applied because authorizing a change to the
wilderness character of a roadless area was the kind of action that required
preparation of an EIS.96 The court observed that “there is an overriding
public interest in preservation of the undeveloped character of the area,”
and consequently enjoined the contested timber sales pending the Forest
Service’s preparation of an EIS.97 Although the injunction applied only to a
few existing timber sale contracts in roadless areas, the effect of the court’s
order was to halt timber sales in all areas identified by RARE I until the
Forest Service prepared an EIS that complied with NEPA.98
The NEPA challenges to RARE I prompted the Forest Service to
abandon that study,99 NEPA’s first large-scale effect on wilderness policy. As
a result of NEPA, RARE I would not give the Forest Service justification for
releasing roadless national forest lands to logging, mining, and other uses
incompatible with wilderness.
In 1977, in an effort to resolve the problems with RARE I, speed the
process of wilderness designation, and open other roadless areas to
nonwilderness uses, the Forest Service initiated a new nationwide
wilderness study: RARE II.100 Although RARE II inventoried more lands than
RARE I—sixty-two million acres as opposed to fifty-six million acres—it too
acquired its share of critics, who also invoked NEPA to challenge the results
of that study.101
“concluded that in view of the lack of significant effect on the human environment and
consideration given to wilderness management, [EISs] were not needed for the sales in
question.”).
94 Id. at 1246 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332). NEPA requires agencies to prepare a “detailed
statement” for all “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
95 Wyo. Outdoor Council, 484 F.2d. at 1246.
96 Id. at 1250; see Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 32, at 347.
97 Wyo. Outdoor Council, 484 F.2d. at 1250 (“We are convinced that a major federal action
significantly affecting the human environment is involved, within the meaning of the statute.”).
98 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43, § 25-11.
99 See Rickart, supra note 31, at 890–91.
100 See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 32, at 349–50; California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp.
465, 471 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (“The asserted purpose of RARE II was to speed the process of
wilderness allocation and to open remaining roadless areas to development.”). The Forest
Service recognized the deficiencies in RARE I, and intended for RARE II to speed up the
planning process. ALLIN, supra note 6, at 161. The RARE II inventory included 2,919 roadless
areas spanning 62 million acres. Anderson & Moncrief, supra note 68, at 420.
101 See Susan Jane M. Brown, “Green Gold:” Securing Protection for Roadless Areas on the
Gifford Pinchot National Forest, 8 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9 (2000) (“RARE II was designed to
incorporate the lessons from RARE I by allocating more time to complete the process
(commencing in 1977 and completed in 1979) and including . . . missed RARE I areas, areas
adjacent to existing wilderness areas, and congressionally designated wilderness study areas.”).
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B. Enjoining RARE II
The Forest Service released the RARE II report and accompanying EIS
in 1979, with the agency’s preferred alternative recommending that Congress
designate fifteen million acres of RARE II lands as wilderness and calling for
further study of 10.8 million acres.102 Even though all RARE II areas met the
minimal statutory requirements for wilderness designation, the Forest
Service recommended that the majority of lands it inventoried in the RARE
II study, some thirty-six million acres—nearly 60%—be classified as
“nonwilderness” and released to multiple use management.103 Almost
immediately upon RARE II’s release, critics of the study filed suit, alleging
the RARE II EIS violated NEPA.104
The State of California and environmentalists challenged the RARE II
recommendations, seeking to enjoin development of roadless areas within
the state.105 California claimed that the RARE II EIS failed to give serious
consideration to the effect of the “nonwilderness” designation on the
wilderness qualities of lands classified of those lands.106 The district court
ruled that the RARE II EIS failed to support the nonwilderness designations
in violation of NEPA.107
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court because the decision to
harvest timber on an undeveloped tract of land is “an irreversible and

Areas overlooked during RARE I included areas that did not meet the Forest Service’s “purist”
interpretation of wilderness. But by the time the agency initiated RARE II, the Department of
Agriculture had directed the Forest Service to revise its definition of wilderness, thus increasing
the amount of wilderness available to inventory. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 32, at
349–50; see also DOUG SCOTT, A WILDERNESS FOREVER FUTURE-HISTORY 17 (2001), available at
http://wilderness.net/toolboxes/documents/awareness/Doug%20Scott-_WildernessForever_Futu
re-history.pdf (explaining that the Forest Service’s “purity doctrine” excluded millions of acres
of “wildlands” that the Forest Service deemed “not wild enough”).
102 John Klein-Robberharr, Comment, Judicial Review of Forest Service Timber Sales:
Environmental Plaintiffs Gain New Options Under the Oregon Wilderness Act, 35 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 201, 206 (1995) (citing Receipt of Environmental Impact Statements, 44 Fed. Reg.
3087 (Jan. 15, 1979)); COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43, at 25-11. See California v. Bergland,
483 F. Supp. 465, 471 E.D. Cal 1980, aff’d sub nom California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.
1982) (explaining that “[f]urther planning” was “a decision not to decide and to leave land use
issues to the ordinary forest planning process.”).
103 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43, at 25-11; ALLIN, supra note 6, at 164; see Bergland
483 F. Supp. at 471 (noting that areas released to nonwilderness could be developed without
further consideration of wilderness issues).
104 Brown, supra note 101, at 10.
105 Bergland, 483 F. Supp. at 469–70. The Natural Resources Defense Council, Trinity
County, and the Clear Creek Legal Defense Fund intervened as plaintiffs. Bergland, 483 F. Supp
at 472. Webco Lumber Company, the National Forest Products Association and Del Norte,
Shasta, and Siskiyou counties intervened as defendants. Id.
106 Id. at 470. California alleged violations of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act and
National Forest Management Act in addition to the NEPA claims, but the court did not reach
those claims. Id. at 472.
107 Id. at 470 (concluding that the Forest Service “either never seriously considered the
impact of its decision on the wilderness qualities of the RARE II areas, or that the Forest
Service has simply failed to disclose the data, assumptions, and conclusions employed by it in
such consideration”).
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irretrievable decision” which could have “serious environmental
consequences.”108 The court identified three distinct NEPA violations: 1) the
RARE II EIS did not adequately discuss site-specific environmental
consequences;109 2) the EIS did not consider an adequate range of
alternatives; and 3) the Forest Service failed to provide the public an
adequate opportunity to comment on its proposal.110
Concerning the requirement that the EIS provide detailed site-specific
analysis for millions of acres of lands, the court recognized the logistical
difficulties, but concluded that the scope of the proposal was the agency’s
choice, and that the scope did not relieve the Forest Service from its NEPAimposed duty of publicly disclosing the site-specific consequences of its
decisions to release millions of acres to nonwilderness.111 In its alternative
ruling, the court suggested that a reasoned decision required the Forest
Service to consider at least one alternative that allocated to wilderness
greater than one-third of the inventoried lands.112 The court’s decision on
public involvement faulted the agency for failing to circulate a draft
supplemental EIS, even though it changed the criteria for making wilderness
allocations, and for failing to provide a meaningful response to public
comment on the draft EIS it did circulate.113
108

Block, 690 F.2d at 763.
The district court had found EIS was deficient on several grounds, including failures to
1) include comprehensive descriptions of the RARE II areas, 2) assess the wilderness value of
each area, 3) discuss the effect of nonwilderness designations on wilderness characteristics and
values, 4) consider the effect of development on potential for future wilderness designation, and
5) balance the economic benefits of nonwilderness classification with the resulting
environmental consequences. See id. at 760. The Ninth Circuit agreed that NEPA required
correction of these deficiencies in order to fulfill its objective of disclosing to the public the
environmental consequences of proposed federal actions. Id. at 763 (interpreting NEPA and the
then-applicable Council on Environmental Quality’s NEPA guidelines).
110 Id. at 762, 765, 769–70.
111 Id. at 765.
112 Although the Forest Service considered eight alternatives, the court concluded that the
alternatives analysis was inadequate, reasoning that the EIS should have included an alternative
that involved increasing production on federal land already open to development and
“[a]llocating to Wilderness a share of the RARE II acreage at an intermediate percentage
between 34% and 100%.” Id. at 765, 766–67. By failing to consider an alternative that allocated
more than a third of the RARE II acreage to wilderness, the agency could not, according to the
Ninth Circuit, make the reasoned choice that NEPA required. Id. at 765. Since all of the RARE II
inventoried acreage met the minimum criteria for wilderness designation, the Forest Service
was not justified in considering only those alternatives that allocated considerably more total
acres to nonwilderness than to wilderness. Id. at 769. The Ninth Circuit did not agree with the
district court that the EIS should also have included an alternative “[e]xpanding the number of
classifications beyond the broad categories Wilderness, Nonwilderness, and Future Planning.”
Id. at 766.
113 Id. at 770, 772. Most of the public comments submitted to the Forest Service discussed
specific areas, but the Forest Service’s EIS failed to identify or discuss any of the site-specific
comments; instead, the Forest Service merely tallied the number of comments received and
listed the number of responses recommending wilderness, nonwilderness or further planning.
Id. at 773. The court recognized that the “agency’s obligation to respond to public comment is
limited” but explained that the agency must provide a ‘“meaningful reference’ to all responsible
opposing viewpoints concerning the agency’s proposed decision.” Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1510(a)
(1977); 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550, 20,555 (1973) (superseded 1978)). The court concluded “that the
109
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California v. Block enjoined the Forest Service from authorizing
activities that would impair the wilderness character of inventoried lands
until it prepared an EIS that complied with NEPA by adequately analyzing
and publicly disclosing the effect of releasing lands to nonwilderness
status.114 Although the case concerned only roadless areas in California, the
Forest Service’s RARE II EIS was nationwide in scope,115 and the court’s
order thus precluded road building and logging in all RARE II lands
classified as nonwilderness.116 The upshot was that the agency could not
release to multiple use management some thirty-six million acres until it
satisfied NEPA.
C. Congressional Intervention
Following the challenge to RARE II in California v. Block, the Forest
Service was poised to initiate RARE III, a third attempt at inventorying and
studying roadless areas, by preparing EISs on wilderness allocations in
individual national forests.117 However, Congress preempted RARE III in

Forest Service was obliged to identify and discuss responsible opposing viewpoints concerning
individual site allocations,” and that the EIS did not satisfy this obligation. Id.
114

Id.

115

COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43, § 25:09. For example, in Earth First v. Block, an
action to enjoin the Forest Service from changing the wilderness character of the North
Kalmiopsis Roadless Area in southern Oregon, the district court held the EIS was inadequate
because it lacked the site-specific analysis required by California v. Block. 569 F. Supp. 415, 417
(D. Or. 1983) (citing Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982)). The court explained that the primary
issue in the case was, as in California v. Block, “whether the Forest Service may designate an
area as Nonwilderness without a site-specific EIS addressed to that issue, relying instead upon
the RARE II EIS which the Ninth Circuit determined was faulty, and a subsequent EIS which
cannot consider the wilderness question but only analyzes the value of various nonwilderness
alternatives.” Id. at 419. The court explained that the Ninth Circuit had already resolved the
issue in California v. Block, and that it was irrelevant whether the lands were in California or
Oregon because the RARE II EIS had nationwide scope. Id. The court therefore concluded that
because the Forest Service failed to prepare an EIS that included site-specific information,
NEPA required it to enjoin road construction, logging, and other nonwilderness uses until the
agency prepared a valid EIS. Id. at 420.
116 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43, § 25:9 (“[A]ll parties understood that any activities
which threatened wilderness values on all RARE II lands would be subject to automatic
injunction,” and recognizing that the court’s interpretation of the Wilderness Act effectively
halted logging and other commercial development on over one-third of national forest lands);
see also Jack Tuholske & Beth Brennan, The National Forest Management Act: Judicial
Interpretation of A Substantive Environmental Statute, 15 PUB. LAND L. REV. 53, 101 (1994)
(asserting that Block “had profound implications for the Forest Service” because it “essentially
prevented [timber harvest] on roadless lands where a site-specific EIS was not in place, and
even when an EIS was prepared, injunctions were still issued.”); Friends of the Bitterroot v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 900 F. Supp. 1368, 1374 (D. Mont. 1991) (granting a preliminary injunction against
timber sales in inventoried roadless areas because the Forest Service failed to consider an
alternative to the proposed sale that preserved the inventoried lands but allowed cutting on
other lands within the sale area).
117 See Brown, supra note 101, at 10 (explaining that the “Forest Service failed to
recommend any lands for inclusion in the NWPS, and instead decided to scrap the entire RARE
II process.”). Following the decision to terminate RARE II, the Forest Service announced it
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most western states by passing a series of state-specific wilderness bills that
designated wilderness amounting to over 8% of the total wilderness system
today.118
Congress took action in response to the repeated failures of the Forest
Service to comply with NEPA in inventorying and studying its roadless
areas, which effectively halted timber harvests in national forest roadless
areas. The timber industry and its Republican allies in the Senate pushed for
national legislation that would designate wilderness areas and release other
roadless areas to development.119 Eventually, the industry and its allies gave
up trying to pass national release legislation and instead focused on passing
state bills that achieved a compromise with wilderness advocates on the fate
of the lands released from initial wilderness consideration.120
From 1984 to 1993, Congress passed twenty-eight state wilderness bills,
adding 9.8 million acres of wilderness, more than 8% of the current acreage
comprising the National Wilderness System.121 In 1984 alone, Congress
passed twenty-one state wilderness laws designating 8.2 million acres of
wilderness and increasing the National Wilderness System by 10%.122 Many of

planned to initiate a RARE III, which would focus on specific national forests, thereby resolving
the “site-specific analysis problems plaguing the agency’s first two attempts.” Id.
118 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1052 (asserting that Congress short-circuited the RARE
III process in many states by passing 19 wilderness bills in 1984 alone); Univ. of Montana,
Wilderness Statistics Reports, http://www.wilderness.net/NWPS/Chart (last visited Apr. 12,
2014); Blumm & Erickson, supra note 10, at 13–16
119 See ROTH & HARMON, supra note 38, at 2 (examining the political maneuvering behind the
state wilderness bills); SCOTT, supra note 101, at 22 (stating the order in California v. Block
“generated great pressure from logging and other development interests for Congress to find
some way to get national forest roadless areas ‘released’ from the requirement for intensive
area-by-area review of wilderness”); see generally Dennis Roth, The Wilderness Movement and
the National Forests: 1980-1984 (1988), available at http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/
xmlui/bitstream/handle/1957/9309/The_Wil_Mov_Nat_For_1980_1984.pdf?sequence=11957/9309/
The_Wil_Mov_Nat_For_1980_1984.pdf?sequence=1 (discussing the legislative history behind
the state wilderness bills).
120 See JAMES MORTON TURNER, THE PROMISE OF WILDERNESS: AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS SINCE 1964, 66–69 (2012) (discussing national release legislation proposed in Congress
and the ensuing political compromises involving wilderness designation and release); see also
COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1,053 (explaining the distinction between “hard” and “soft”
release language; the latter prevailed, meaning the nonwilderness roadless areas would be
released from wilderness consideration until the revision of the pertinent Forest Service land
plan).
121 Wilderness Statistics Reports, supra note 118 (estimates include acreage added through
passage of ANILCA); Blumm & Erickson, supra note 10, at 15.
122 Wilderness Statistics Reports, supra note 118 (select “Public Laws Enacted by Year” and
“Acreage Legislated by Year”) (estimates include acreage added through passage of ANILCA).
More new wilderness areas—175—were added to the system in 1984 than in any other year. Id.
(select “Wilderness Areas Designated by Year”). Thirty statewide national forest wilderness bills
with release language were enacted between 1980 and 1990. ROSS W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41649, WILDERNESS LAWS: STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND PROHIBITED AND PERMITTED USES 7
(2011). In 1984 alone, Congress passed state wilderness bills for Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1136. Congress failed to pass bills for Colorado,
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these state wilderness bills adopted the RARE II allocations, although in
some states the amount of land allocated to wilderness far exceeded that
recommended in RARE II.123 The bills designated new wilderness areas while
“releasing” roadless areas not designated as wilderness for development.124
The fate of the roadless areas “released” from wilderness consideration
was the subject of much congressional debate.125 The timber industry and
other development interests favored “hard release” of such areas, meaning
that the Forest Service would conduct no future wilderness reviews of
roadless areas not initially recommended for wilderness in the state bills and
the areas would be made permanently available for nonwilderness uses.126
Wilderness advocates, in contrast, wanted the Forest Service to consider
wilderness issues during project planning so long as the released areas
remained roadless; in other words, no release.127 However, as a result of
legislative compromise in 1984, the state wilderness bills included “soft
release” language that released nondesignated areas to multiple use
management until the Forest Service revised forest plans required by the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA), generally ten to fifteen years
later.128
The compromise achieved by timber interests and wilderness advocates
on the fate of released lands meant the Forest Service was not required to
consider the wilderness designation option when drafting its first generation
of forest plans.129 However, during the forest plan revision process, the
Idaho, Montana, and several other states in 1984, although it eventually enacted bills for Nevada
in 1989 and Colorado in 1993. Id.
123 Anderson & Moncrief, supra note 68, at 420 n.44 (noting that the Oregon Wilderness Act
designated nearly one million acres as wilderness lands, although RARE II recommended only
370,000 acres for wilderness designation).
124 See Dennis Baird et al., Mediating the Idaho Wilderness Controversy, in MEDIATING
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 229, 231 (J. Walton Blackburn & Willa Marie
Bruce eds., 1995); see, e.g., Wyoming Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-550, § 102(b)(2), 98
Stat. 2807, 2807 (1984). Part of the purpose of the Wyoming Wilderness Act was to “insure that
certain National Forest System lands in the State of Wyoming be made available for uses other
than wilderness in accordance with applicable national forest laws and planning
procedures . . . .” Id.
125 See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1052–53 (explaining that the “release” issue was a
“major point of contention in Forest Service (and BLM) wilderness legislation” and that it
“stymied legislative action for some time[]”).
126 Id. at 1053; see also JAMES MORTON TURNER, THE PROMISE OF WILDERNESS: AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS SINCE 1964, at 199 (2012) (explaining that wilderness advocates
favored a so-called “soft release,” in contrast to the so-called “hard release” advocated by the
timber industry which would bar future consideration of wilderness); FOREST SERV., FS 391, THE
WILDERNESS MOVEMENT AND THE NATIONAL FORESTS: 1964–1980, at 65–67 (1984) (describing the
legislative history behind the release and sufficiency language in the state bills); Brown, supra
note 101, at 10–11 (describing the difference between “hard release” and “soft release”).
127 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1053.
128 Id.; COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43, § 25-10; see, e.g., Washington State Wilderness
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-339, 98 Stat. 299 (1984) (including soft release language typical of the
state wilderness bills). Because the initial NFMA plans have all been completed, release
language is no longer relevant for national forest wilderness legislation. GORTE, supra note 122,
at 7.
129 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1,053.
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agency would again be required to consider the wilderness designation
option for previously released areas that remained undeveloped.130 The
Forest Service need not preserve the released roadless areas; instead, the
areas were to be managed for multiple use.131 The release language also
typically immunized the Forest Service from judicial review involving the
released areas by declaring the RARE II study to be adequate consideration
of wilderness suitability for inventoried lands.132 Implications of the soft
release language are further explored below in Part V.A.133
While Congress was acting to designate wilderness through state bills,
the Forest Service, which had abandoned RARE III, was in the process of
developing forest plans required by NFMA.134 In states where Congress was
unsuccessful in passing a wilderness bill,135 NFMA forest plans reviewed
roadless areas and made wilderness allocations that largely mirrored the
RARE II allocations.136 The plans typically recommended wilderness for only
a small portion of the inventoried roadless areas,137 while releasing lands not
recommended for wilderness to multiple use management.138 The
environmental effects of those plans were subject to evaluation and public
disclosure in individual plan EISs.139 Environmental groups challenged the
130
131
132

Id.
Id.
Id. (identifying relevant language in the Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984, and

explaining that the “net effect” of the WSWA release language was to provide general immunity
from wilderness-based review except for areas that were not inventoried as part of RARE II).
133 Discussing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 4. F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1993); Smith v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 33 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1994); City of Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402
(9th Cir. 1985).
134 See Baird et al., supra note 124, at 231; see also Jack Tuholske & Beth Brennan, The

National Forest Management Act: Judicial Interpretation of a Substantive Environmental
Statute, 15 PUB. LAND L. REV. 53, 101–02 (1994) (explaining that “[t]he RARE III analysis was
incorporated into each forest plan EIS, and contained much more site-specific information
about each roadless area . . . including its wilderness suitability, resource trade-offs from
development versus preservation, and the consequences of implementing the forest plan’s
management prescription for the area.”).
135 States with national forest wilderness areas but not statewide wilderness bills with
release language include Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, South Carolina, and
South Dakota. GORTE, supra note 122, at 7 n.17. Forest plans for National Forest lands
addressed by the state wilderness bills did not include wilderness recommendations, but to
address public concern about roadless areas that were released by the state wilderness bills,
some plans did include roadless area reviews. Anderson & Moncrief, supra note 68, at 422.
136 Baird et al., supra note 124, at 231; see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.7(c)(v) (2012) (requiring
forest plans to “[i]dentify and evaluate lands that may be suitable for inclusion in the National
Wilderness Preservation System and determine whether to recommend any such lands for
wilderness designation.”); Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 32, at 352 (explaining that “forest
plans evaluate[d] roadless areas for potential wilderness recommendations to Congress and
establish[ed] general management direction for congressionally designated wilderness areas.”).
137 Anderson & Moncrief, supra note 68, at 422 (noting that the Idaho Panhandle National
Forest plan recommended only four of the 47 inventoried roadless areas, just 18% of total
roadless acreage in the forest).
138 Baird et al., supra note 124, at 231.
139 Id.; see also Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 32, at 347 (noting that California v. Block
meant courts would “closely scrutinize” forest plan EISs for roadless areas allocated to
nonwilderness management and suggesting that “the single most important feature of the forest
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wilderness recommendations in at least one of these “first generation” Land
and Resource Management Plans (LRMPs).140

D. NEPA and Wilderness Expansion in National Forests
The wilderness wars of the 1980s left long lasting effects. Of course,
following the legislative compromises achieved in 1984, state wilderness
bills increased wilderness acreage by more than 12%.141 Many other roadless
acres were removed from timber harvesting and road building, at least
temporarily, in the form of the “further study” category.142 Most of these
acres would later be preserved by the Forest Service’s “roadless rule,”
discussed below in Part V.A.
Other after-effects linger. The effort to “release” wilderness-inventoried
land not recommended for wilderness designation for multiple use
management seemed to encourage a political movement in favor of multiple
use. Extractive industries—represented by the mining, timber, and grazing
lobbies—seemed to embrace multiple use as a synonym for public lands
development.143 Multiple use has become a symbol for extractive
development on public lands in the twenty-first century West.144

plan’s EIS for a roadless area is a detailed, site-specific analysis of the environmental
consequences of nonwilderness management.”).
140 In Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, environmental groups challenged the Forest
Service’s decision to recommend against wilderness designation for 43 of 47 roadless areas in
the Idaho Panhandle Land and Resource Management Plan. 956 F.2d 1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
The plaintiffs alleged the EIS for the plan violated NEPA and the Wilderness Act. Id. The
environmental groups alleged: 1) that the EIS violated NEPA because it did not consider the
alternative of logging timber from already developed lands and recommending the roadless
areas for wilderness, and 2) that the Service failed to disclose the value of the timber proposed
for harvest on the roadless areas. Id. at 1519. The district court determined the plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue and granted summary judgment to the defendants. Id. at 1510. The Ninth Circuit
reversed on the standing issue but affirmed the district court’s decision on the merits,
concluding that: 1) the Forest Service complied with NEPA by considering and then rejecting an
alternative based on timber production in already developed areas, and 2) “NEPA does not
require a particularized assessment of non-environmental impact,” such as the value of timber
harvest on roadless areas. Id. at 1522–23.
141 See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (81,250,019 acres of wilderness prior to
1984, 9.8 million acres added through state wilderness bills passed from 1984–1993); Wilderness
Statistics Reports, supra note 118.
142 See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D. Wyo. 1980) (noting
the “further study” designation preserved 10.8 million acres of national forest); see also infra
note 256 and accompanying text (noting there were over 58 million roadless acres preserved by
the Forest Service’s roadless rule).
143 See Hardt, supra note 20, at 348 (“In recent years, however, many environmental groups
have criticized the multiple use doctrine for failing to protect environmental values, while
development interests have embraced it as a mandate that the federal lands remain open to
commodity uses.”).
144 See Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 140, 152 (1999) (arguing that by “[o]perating under the mandate of multiple use, the Forest
Service and the BLM historically have permitted commodity uses to dominate the public
lands.”); Zellmer, supra note 32, at 32 (recognizing the “long-standing multiple-use paradigm
based on commodity production”). Multiple use was once opposed by the timber industry
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Another after-effect of the 1980s wilderness wars concerns the
controversy over the “release” language in the 1980s wilderness bills.145
Congress resolved the issue of when roadless areas in national forest could
or would again receive wilderness consideration in the 1980s.146 In the case
of BLM wilderness lands, this issue remains unresolved and highly
controversial. We discuss the controversy in Part V.B. below.147
IV. NEPA’S ROLE IN WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT
After the 1980s expansion of the wilderness system, wilderness
advocates shifted some of their focus from wilderness designation to
wilderness management. As in the case of wilderness expansion, NEPA
played an underappreciated role in ensuring that wilderness is managed not
for commercial uses, but to protect wilderness characteristics.148 The
Wilderness Act forbids roads, commercial development, structures, and
motorized vehicles in wilderness areas, but permits federal agencies to
authorize some wilderness-incompatible activities if “necessary.”149 Courts
have interpreted NEPA to significantly constrain the discretion of federal
agencies in managing wilderness areas, providing conservationists an
important vehicle to ensure that managing agencies provide adequate
justification before authorizing activities likely to harm wilderness
resources.150

A. Enjoining Management for Nonwilderness Purposes
The Wilderness Act authorizes the Forest Service to take “measures . . .
as may be necessary in the control of fire, insects, and diseases, subject to
because it authorized the preservationist policies of Leopold and Marshall. See supra notes 20,
27–31 and accompanying text. However, by the late 20th century, multiple use became a rallying
cry for commodity users. See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands:
Why Multiple Use Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405 (1994).
145 See supra notes 125–32 and accompanying text.
146

Id.

147

One legacy of the 1980s wilderness wars that did not have substantial effect on efforts to
protect wild lands was the California v. Block court’s expansive ruling on the scope of
permissible NEPA alternatives, which the Ninth Circuit did not apply in the context of the
Forest Service’s roadless rule. See infra notes 258–81 and accompanying text.
148 See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43, at § 25:44 (“Once Congress declares an area
wilderness, very few commercial or commodity uses are allowed” and federal land agencies
have a duty to preserve wilderness as wilderness.).
149 Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1) (2006) (“Within wilderness areas
designated by this chapter the use of aircraft or motorboats, where these uses have already
become established, may be permitted to continue subject to such restrictions as the Secretary
of Agriculture deems desirable. In addition, such measures may be taken as may be necessary in
the control of fire, insects, and diseases, subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems
desirable.”). See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43, § 25:44 to § 25:45.
150 See infra notes 164–66 and accompanying text; see also Appel, supra note 18, at 89
(explaining that where courts have considered agency authorizations of activities with potential
to harm wilderness characteristics, they have required the agencies to provide “somewhat
careful reasoning”).
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such conditions as the Secretary [of Agriculture] deems desirable.”151 In the
1980s, environmental groups filed several suits seeking to enjoin Forest
Service attempts to control outbreaks of the southern pine beetle in
wilderness areas.152 Beetle infestations were killing large swaths of pine
forests in Texas and the Southeast, forests that provided important habitat
for the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker.153 In 1982, the Forest Service
initiated a control program that sought to curb the spread of beetle
infestations by cutting both infested trees and healthy trees surrounding
infestations in order to create “buffer zones.”154
In Sierra Club v. Block, the Sierra Club sought to enjoin the Forest
Service from cutting trees as part of the beetle control program in several
wilderness areas,155 alleging that the program violated the Wilderness Act,
NEPA, and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).156 The Forest Service
maintained the control program was necessary to prevent the beetle from
destroying the commercial value of privately owned pine forests adjacent to
wilderness areas and to protect woodpecker colonies from habitat loss
caused by the beetle.157
The Forest Service had prepared Environmental Assessments (EAs) for
the control program in each of the three involved national forests; all three
EAs concluded the control program would not result in any significant effect
on the environment.158 The district court identified “significant defects” in the
EAs, ruling that they failed to adequately address the adverse effects of

151

16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1) (2006).
See Sierra Club v. Block (Block I), 614 F. Supp. 488, 490 (D.D.C. 1985); Sierra Club v.
Lyng (Lyng I), 662 F. Supp. 40, 41 (D.D.C. 1987), Sierra Club v. Lyng (Lyng II), 663 F. Supp 556,
557 (D.D.C. 1987); Sierra Club v. Block (Block II), 614 F. Supp. 134, 135 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
153 See generally John Shurts, Wilderness Management and the Southern Pine Beetle, 17
ENVTL. L. 671, 671–74 (1987) (describing the southern pine beetle problem and Forest Service
control measures); Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honnold, Managing the Balances of Nature: The
Legal Framework of Wilderness Management, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 152, 266–67 (1988) (describing
southern pine beetle ecology and management).
154 See Block I, 614 F. Supp. at 490–91 (explaining that between 1982 and 1985 the Forest
Service issued three EAs, one covering the southern pine beetle control program for each of
three separate national forests). The Forest Service justified the control program by
rationalizing that absent the program, “the southern pine beetle infestations may destroy
commercial and environmental value of the pine forests.” Id.; see also Rohlf & Honnold, supra
note 153, at 266–67 (suggesting that the Forest Service’s claim that tree cutting was “essential to
preventing wide scale and irreparable destruction by the voracious southern pine beetle” meant
the agency “either misunderstood or disregarded the congressional mandate to preserve the
wilderness character of southeastern forests”).
155 Block I, 614 F. Supp. at 490 (challenging the southern pine beetle control program in the
Black Creek and Leaf Wilderness Area in DeSoto National Forest, Mississippi; the Caney Creek
Wilderness Area in Ouchita National Forest, Arkansas; and the Kisatchie Hills Wilderness Area
in Kistchie Hills National Forest, Louisiana); see also Block II, 614 F. Supp. at 135 (considering
similar issues in federal wilderness areas in Texas but denying a request for a preliminary
injunction).
156 Block I, 614 F. Supp. at 490.
152

157
158

Id.
See id. at 490–91.
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cutting trees in wilderness areas.159 Recognizing NEPA requires preparation
of an EIS, not an EA, where a proposal is likely to have major effects,160 the
court explained “[o]ne could not rationally conclude that cutting thousands
of acres of pine trees in a wilderness forest will not have any major
effects.”161 The court observed that the Forest Service failed to discuss the
efficacy of the cutting program, explaining that “[i]f the cutting has a limited
or no effect on the number of pine trees lost to beetle infestations,
wilderness area policy might be better served by no control.”162
Consequently, the court granted the Sierra Club’s request for an injunction
on its NEPA claim.163
The injunction prevented the Forest Service from cutting trees in the
wilderness areas.164 The court decided that without an EIS, the Forest
Service could not authorize timber harvesting of insect-damaged timber
inside a wilderness area for the benefit of commercial timberlands outside
the wilderness area.165 The case suggested that courts will employ NEPA to
give close scrutiny to management actions in wilderness areas that threaten
wilderness values, even though after preparing an EIS the Forest Service
ultimately was able to proceed with a pared down beetle harvest program.166
159 Id. (noting that an earlier EIS on commercial timber harvests in forest lands did not
address wilderness values, and observing that the EAs the Forest Service did prepare contained
only a “cursory and perfunctory” discussion of wilderness issues).
160 Id. at 491. Although regulations from the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) are
not binding on courts, they provide that “major” effects are actually “significant” effects. See 40
C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2013) (stating that “[m]ajor reinforces but does not have a meaning
independent of “significantly” as found in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27).
161 Block I, 614 F. Supp. at 491 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.18, 1508.25) (recognizing that “under
CEQ’s definitions, any action ‘with effects that may be major’ in light of its context and intensity
requires a EIS.”).
162 Id. at 491–92.
163 Id. at 492, 494 (concluding that plaintiffs showed a likelihood of prevailing on the merits
of the NEPA claim and issuing a limited preliminary injunction allowing for cutting as needed to
protect the red-cockaded woodpecker).
164 Id. at 494. The court limited the injunction on tree cutting to allow spot cutting where
necessary to serve the public interest in preserving specific red-cockaded woodpecker colonies.
Id. at 493–94.
165 Id. (explaining that the injunction did not apply to timber harvests aimed at controlling
beetle infestations in or near active red-cockaded woodpecker colony sites where the cutting
was “undertaken for the sole purpose of preventing harm to the red-cockaded woodpeckers”).
166 After Sierra Club v. Block, the Forest Service prepared an EIS that emphasized that
timber harvests as part of a beetle control program must not interfere with natural ecological
processes, recommending a substantial reduction in the amount of tree cutting within the
wilderness areas. See Rohlf & Honnold, supra note 153, at 267. In a later case concerning the
same project, Sierra Club v. Lyng (Lyng I), the Sierra Club argued the Secretary could not
authorize the beetle control program in wilderness areas without demonstrating the program
was necessary. 662 F. Supp. 40, 41 (D.D.C. 1987). The court concluded that the beetle control
program was directed at furthering adjacent property interests, not wilderness interests or
national wilderness policy, and therefore ruled the Secretary did not have the same broad
management discretion normally afforded him under the Wilderness Act and held the program
was an abuse of the Secretary’s discretion. Id. at 42–43. Following release of the EIS on March
6, 1987, the parties returned to court in Sierra Club v. Lyng (Lyng II). 663 F. Supp. 556, 557
(D.D.C. 1987). The NEPA claim was settled following completion of the EIS, the ESA claim was
declared moot, and the only issue left for consideration was the Wilderness Act claim. Id. at 557.
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Outside of the beetle control context, courts have enjoined other
nonwilderness activities in wilderness areas for failure to comply with
NEPA. For example, in Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto, the district court for
the Western District of Washington ruled that the Forest Service violated
NEPA and the Wilderness Act when it repaired and then relocated a fire
lookout in a designated wilderness area.167 The Forest Service claimed that
NEPA did not apply because the project fell within a categorical exclusion
for repair and maintenance of recreation sites and facilities,168 but the court
ruled that the Forest Service “abused its discretion by not conducting an EIS
or EA” before embarking on the repair project.169 The court reasoned the
project did not involve the type of minor projects associated with ordinary
maintenance that would normally be categorically excluded, and recognized
that the project involved a specially protected area.170 Ruling that the Forest
Service violated both NEPA and the Wilderness Act, the court ordered the
agency to remove the structure.171
In other cases, environmental groups have effectively invoked NEPA on
nonwilderness lands to enjoin Forest Service activities with the potential to
significantly affect wilderness resources.172 In one such case, Izaak Walton

The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Wilderness Act claim
because the Secretary had provided sufficient evidence the cutting was necessary, and the
Secretary’s decision to implement the control program was not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at
560–61.
167 Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1077 (W.D. Wash. 2012). In
September 1998, the Forest Service issued a memo regarding its decision to repair a fire lookout
that was built in the 1930s. Id. at 1067. The agency authorized contractors and volunteers to use
rock drills and helicopters to repair the lookout’s foundation. Id. However, in 2002, the Forest
Service went beyond the plan outlined in the decision memo and disassembled the lookout,
transported pieces of the lookout offsite by helicopter, constructed a new foundation, flew new
and restored pieces of the lookout back to the site, and reassembled lookout structure onsite.
Id. at 1067–68.
168 Id. at 1067.
169 Id. at 1077.
170
171

Id.
Id. at 1079.

172 Courts have also invoked NEPA to enjoin activities on nonwilderness lands providing
habitat connectivity between designated wilderness areas, where the environmental impacts of
such activities were not adequately assessed. For example, in Marble Mountain Audubon
Society v. Rice, 914 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit enjoined postfire salvage logging
in the Klamath National Forest because the Forest Service did not adequately assess the
adverse effects on a biological corridor connecting two wilderness areas. 914 F.2d at 180, 182.
The Forest Service adopted an intensive timber management strategy, planning to maximize the
harvest of standing timber, likely through clearcutting. Id. at 180. The agency released an
accompanying EIS that examined the adverse environmental effects anticipated to result from
the timber harvest, but the court concluded that the EIS gave fish and wildlife concerns “only
cursory attention” and failed to discuss the biological corridor or consider the unique value of
area as the only significant biological corridor connecting two wilderness areas. Id.; see also
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Blackwell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (enjoining timber
sale after concluding that the Forest Service violated NEPA because, even though it did
recognize that the project area provided important habitat connectivity between a wilderness
area and a late successional reserve, its determination that there would be no significant effect
to the area was conclusory).
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League of America v. Kimbell,173 environmental organizations sued the Forest
Service, challenging the agency’s decision to construct a snowmobile trail
connecting lakes adjacent to the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness
(BWCAW).174 The federal district court of Minnesota ruled that the Forest
Service failed to provide adequate analysis supporting its conclusion that the
snowmobile trail did not significantly affect the noise environment of the
BWCAW.175 The court explained “the sounds of snowmobiles and ATVs from
a snowmobile trail on the perimeter of the BWCAW, high above a wilderness
lake will surely impact the solitude of the wilderness.”176 The court
consequently ordered the Forest Service to prepare an EIS that more
thoroughly considered the sound effects in the BWCAW, enjoining activity
on the snowmobile trail pending completion of an EIS that complied with
NEPA.177

B. Permits and Cumulative Impact Analyses
In another controversy over wilderness management, High Sierra
Backpackers Ass’n v. Blackwell,178 conservation groups sued the Forest
Service, seeking to enjoin the agency’s issuance of special-use permits to
commercial packstock operators in two designated wilderness areas.179 The
conservationists claimed the permits violated both NEPA and the Wilderness
Act.180 The district court granted the Forest Service summary judgment on
High Sierra’s claim that the Forest Service was violating the Wilderness Act
by allowing commercial services that degraded the wilderness areas.181 The
court explained that the Forest Service had broad discretion under the
Wilderness Act to determine how much commercial pack-use to allow and
how to deal with the impacts, but nevertheless granted High Sierra’s motion
for summary judgment on the NEPA claim.182 The court concluded the Forest
Service violated NEPA by issuing multi-year special-use permits and granting

173

516 F. Supp. 2d 982, 997 (D. Minn. 2007).
Id. at 997.
175 Id. at 995–96.
176 Id. at 997.
177 Id. at 996–97 (citing Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 352 F. Supp. 2d 909, 927 (D. Minn. 2005)). In
Bosworth, the court, assessing whether the timber harvest in a narrow strip of land between
two parts of the BWCAW would significantly affect the wilderness, determined the affected
wilderness was “used heavily year-round by recreational visitors,” and that the Forest Service
had failed to include analysis of potential illegal motorized use in the wilderness area caused by
new road construction. 352 F. Supp. 2d at 924–25. The Bosworth court ruled that the Forest
Service failed to adequately analyze environmental impacts, including cumulative impacts,
resulting from the timber sale and enjoined the sale pending completion of an EIS. Id. at 927.
178 390 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2003).
179 Id. at 635–36. The conservation groups challenged the Forest Service’s actions in issuing
multiyear special-use permits and granting one-year renewals of special-use permits. Id. at 636.
180 Id. at 637.
174

181
182

Id.
Id. at 638.
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one-year renewals of special-use permits to commercial packers without
first completing an EIS.183
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling that the Forest
Service violated NEPA by failing to assess the individual and cumulative
impacts of the issuance of multi-year special-use permits and renewals of
special-use permits to commercial pack-stock operators.184 The Forest
Service asserted the special-use permits and one-year renewals were
categorically excluded from NEPA, but the court noted that the Forest
Service’s own regulations do not permit the categorical exclusion of
activities in wilderness areas.185 Because the categorical exclusion does not
apply to “congressionally designated areas, such as wilderness, wilderness
study areas, or National Recreational Areas,” NEPA required the Forest
Service to prepare an EA or EIS on its one-year renewals of the special-use
permits.186 Since the agency did no NEPA analysis, the court ruled the permit
issuance “lacked the formality it was legally required to have,” and therefore
violated both NEPA and the Wilderness Act.187
In Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz,188 the plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent logging in the Boundary
Waters Canoe Area (BWCA)189 in northern Minnesota until the agency
complied with NEPA by completing an EIS.190 The district court concluded
that the cumulative effect of the Forest Service’s actions regarding timber
sales in the BWCA constituted major federal actions significantly affecting
the human environment and ruled that NEPA therefore required the Forest

183 Id. The district court ordered the Forest Service to complete a NEPA analysis of
cumulative impacts and a site-specific analysis for each permittee and, in the interim, ordered a
reduction in the allocation of special-use permits and limited access to areas of environmental
concern. Id.
184 Id. at 648–49 (also reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Forest
Service on the Wilderness claim and holding that there were “triable issues of fact regarding
whether the Forest Service damaged the wilderness areas.”).
185 Id. at 641 (citing Forest Service Handbook 1909.15, 30.3(1)(a)—(b)).
186 Id. (emphasis in original).
187 Id. at 648. Even though some of the permits were simply renewals of existing permits,
the court explained that maintaining status quo use levels did not comply with the Wilderness
Act because “[a]t best, when the Forest Service simply continued preexisting permit levels, it
failed to balance the impact that that level of commercial activity was having on the wilderness
character of the land. At worst, the Forest Service elevated recreational activity over the longterm preservation of the wilderness character of the land.” Id. at 647.
188 Butz I, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973), aff’d, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
189 The BWCA is a federally designated wilderness in Superior National Forest created by
the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978. See Boundary Waters Canoe Area
Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978).
190 Butz I, 358 F. Supp. at 587. The plaintiffs challenged private logging operations under
Forest Service timber sales that took place prior to the effective date of NEPA. See 498 F.2d at
1317. The plaintiffs also claimed that logging in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA)
should be prohibited because it was “incompatible with the wilderness values protected by the
Wilderness Act.” Id. The government countered that NEPA did not apply because there was no
major federal action after the effective date of NEPA. Id.
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Service to prepare an EIS.191 The court enjoined logging on land contiguous
with undeveloped areas of the BWCA until the Forest Service prepared an
EIS complying with NEPA, and the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc,
affirmed.192 The Eighth Circuit held that the Forest Service’s modification or
extension of some of the contracts and its supervision of defendant’s daily
logging activities constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment within the purview of NEPA.193
In Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck,194 a coalition of
counties, outfitters, and other citizens (the outfitters) alleged that the Forest
Service violated NEPA in its EIS for a plan amending the Superior National
Forest LRMP.195 The outfitters claimed that the EIS did not adequately
consider all available alternatives, available data, economic effects of the
plan on local communities, and the effects of restricting visitor use on their
own use of the area.196 The district court dismissed the NEPA claim, but the
Eighth Circuit ruled that the outfitters had standing to bring the NEPA
claims. Ulitmately though, it concluded that the EIS complied with NEPA,
and therefore affirmed the lower court’s judgment in favor of the
government.197 The court recognized that federal agencies are not required to
consider alternatives contrary to NEPA’s goal to “attain the widest range of
beneficial uses of the environment without degradation.”198 The Forest

191 Butz I, 358 F. Supp. at 622, 630. The activities of the Forest Service concerning these 11
pre-NEPA timber sales fell roughly into three categories: contract extensions, contract
modifications, and the administrative actions required by the contracts. 498 F.2d at 1318.
192 Butz I, 358 F. Supp. at 630; 498 F.2d at 1322, 1325. In subsequent litigation, the district
court reconciled the Wilderness Act’s contemplation of some logging within BWCA with the
general constraint against development not “necessary” for wilderness administration by
enjoining logging within or adjacent to large tracts of previously unlogged forest. MPIRG v. Butz
(Butz II), 401 F. Supp. 1276, 1276 (D. Minn. 1975), rev’d, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976).
193 498 F. 2d at 1316. Following the Forest Service’s publication of the EIS and an associated
management plan for the BWCA, MPIRG and the Sierra Club sued the Forest Service and
others, claiming the EIS and management plan were procedurally and substantively inadequate
under NEPA, and the Wilderness Act prohibited commercial logging in the virgin forest areas of
the BWCA. Butz II, 401 F. Supp. at 1282 (D. Minn. 1975). The district court, agreeing with the
plaintiffs, held the EIS did not comply with NEPA and the Wilderness Act and prohibited
logging in areas contiguous to the remaining large blocks of virgin forest in the BWCA. Id. at
1333. The court permanently enjoined existing and future timber sales in the areas contiguous
to the remaining virgin forest areas of the BWCA. Id. at 1334. The Eighth Circuit, again sitting en
banc, reversed the district court, holding that the Forest Service complied with NEPA by
preparing an EIS that was procedurally and substantively adequate under NEPA. Butz II, 541
F.2d 1292, 1295, 1299 (8th Cir. 1976) (explaining “the district court’s review of the EIS was
infected with an impermissibly broad view of its power to review the Forest Service’s
substantive decision to permit logging as a vegetation management tool in the BWCA”).
194 164 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1999).
195 Id. at 1120. Friends of Boundary Waters challenged the Forest Service’s BWCA
Wilderness Management Plan and Implementation Schedule of 1993, which the court referred to
as a “wilderness plan.” Id. at 1119. The wilderness plan amended the 1986 Land and Resource
Management Plan for the Superior National Forest, which directed management actions in the
BWCA. Id. at 1120.
196 Id. at 1127.
197 Id. at 1131.
198 Id. at 1129 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (2006)).
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Service sought to limit recreation in the BWCA Wilderness because visitor
use levels were already “beginning to strain the viability and solitude of the
wilderness area and to degrade the intended primitive recreational
experience.”199 Consequently, the court concluded that the agency’s EIS
adequately addressed the “environmental, recreational, social, and economic
impacts of the . . . Plan.”200
V. NEPA’S ROLE IN PRESERVING POTENTIAL WILDERNESS
NEPA has played an important role in protecting areas with wilderness
quality that have not been formally designated as wilderness. For example,
in a decision involving Forest Service management of roadless areas, the
Ninth Circuit required the agency to evaluate the effect of logging in order to
protect the congressional prerogative of designating wilderness in the
future.201 The Tenth Circuit ruled that when approving a road improvement
bisecting two wilderness study areas, the BLM not only had the duty to
examine less damaging alternatives, but also to select the least damaging
alternative it studied.202 In these decisions, NEPA imposed important curbs
on agency discretion in managing lands with wilderness potential.

A. NEPA and Roadless Areas in National Forests
NEPA has been essential to maintaining roadless areas for future
wilderness consideration. In a series of cases involving roadless areas on
Forest Service lands, the Ninth Circuit distinguished roadlessness, an
environmental condition, from wilderness, a legal concept. The Forest
Service argued that release and sufficiency language in state wilderness acts
of the 1980s precluded courts from reviewing projects involving roadless
areas.203 The Ninth Circuit confirmed the acts did not release individual
projects from judicial review,204 clarifying that although the statutes may not
have described all undeveloped roadless-in-fact areas in the relevant states
as roadless for purposes of further evaluation, that fact did not exempt the

199
200
201

Id.
Id. at 1131.
See Smith v. U.S. Forest Serv., 33 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Friends of the

Bitterroot v. U.S. Forest Serv., CV 90-76-BU (D. Mont. July 30, 1991) (granting a preliminary
injunction against timber sales in inventoried roadless areas because the Forest Service failed
to consider an alternative to the proposed sale that preserved the inventoried lands but allowed
cutting on other lands within the sale area).
202 See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1090–91 (10th Cir. 1988) (concerning expansion
of the Burr Trail); see infra notes 284–301 and accompanying text.
203 See infra notes 209, 228 and accompanying text.
204 See Michael J. Gippert & Vincent L. DeWitte, The Nature of Land and Resource
Management Planning Under the National Forest Management Act, 3 ENVTL. L. 149, 198–99
(1996) (citing Smith, 33 F.3d at 1077–78; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 4 F.3d 832,
836–37 (9th Cir. 1993); City of Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1405–06 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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Forest Service from considering the roadless value of these lands during
NEPA review.205
The first of these cases involved the Oregon Wilderness Act, which
created several wilderness areas and released other roadless areas to
multiple use management.206 In National Audubon Society v. U.S. Forest
Service,207 environmentalists objected to timber sales in released areas and
abutting roadless areas of Rogue River National Forest.208 The Forest Service
argued that by not specifically describing the sale areas as “roadless,”
Congress intended to preclude judicial review, and therefore NEPA did not
apply.209 The district court rejected this interpretation, holding that
roadlessness is a question of fact, not of law, reasoning that “[t]he
designation of an area as ‘roadless’ for the purpose of determining the broad
category of future development possibilities is not synonymous with an
assessment of whether . . . significant environmental consequences will
result from development of the area.”210 The court enjoined timber sales until
the agency completed an EIS describing the timber sales’ consequences on
the roadless and undeveloped nature of the sale tracts.211
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the release language did not
immunize the timber sales from judicial review of NEPA compliance.212 The
205 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 4 F.3d at 837; see also John Klein-Robbehaar, Comment,
Judicial Review of Forest Service Timber Sales: Environmental Plaintiffs Gain New Options
Under the Oregon Wilderness Act, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 201, 218 (1995) (arguing that Audubon
Society “provides new options to environmental groups who wish to challenge old growth

timber sales. . . . an environmental group can challenge a timber sale on the basis of the
roadlessness of the land”).
206 See Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984, 16 U.S.C.A. § 460oo (West 2010).
207 4 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1993), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 46 F.3d
1437 (9th Cir. 1993).
208 Id. at 834.
209 Id. at 836.
210 Nat’l. Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20,828,
20,829 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 1990).
211 Id. at 20,830.
212 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 4 F.3d at 837. The court reasoned that release language in the
Oregon Wilderness Act prohibiting judicial review applied to wilderness designations, not
roadless or roaded determinations. Id. The Oregon Wilderness Act specified that the agency did
not need to review the wilderness option for individual project reviews, but it did not exempt
the Forest Service from considering the roadless option. Id. The court noted it had previously
held that “[t]he RARE II EIS addresses only the environmental impact of allocating certain lands
to wilderness status.” Id. (citing Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985)).
In Tenakee Springs, the City of Tenakee Springs and the Southeast Alaska Conservation Council
challenged the Forest Service’s decision to build a road in area of the Tongass National Forest
classified as “nonwilderness” under RARE II. 778 F.2d at 1403. The plaintiffs alleged the Forest
Service violated NEPA by failing to adequately consider environmental effects of the road
construction on an undeveloped area of the forest. Id. ANILCA provided that the “legal and
factual sufficiency” of the RARE II EIS for Alaska National Forests was not subject to judicial
review, but the Ninth Circuit, reversing the district court, held that ANILCA did not preclude
judicial review of the Tongass Forest Plan EIS. Id. at 1405. The court explained that the RARE II
allocations were recommendations, not mandates for development; the Forest Service still
retained the option of considering an alternative that would not result in developing the areas
classified as “nonwilderness.” Id. at 1406. The court concluded the Forest Service violated
NEPA and enjoined further construction of the road project. Id. at 1407; see also COGGINS ET AL.,
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court determined the Oregon Wilderness Act aimed to immunize only Forest
Service wilderness reviews from judicial scrutiny, and not subsequent
project decisions.213
In a similar case involving the 1984 Washington Wilderness Act,214 the
Ninth Circuit, relying on the reasoning in National Audubon, enjoined timber
sales on a roadless area pending completion of an EIS pursuant to NEPA.215
In Smith v. U.S. Forest Service, a recreational user challenged the Forest
Service’s assessment of the environmental impacts of a proposed timber sale
in a roadless area of the Colville National Forest in Washington.216 The
timber sale area included both inventoried and uninventoried roadless lands
in the Gatorson Planning Area.217
In 1988, the Forest Service issued a plan for the Colville National Forest
that called for logging the area.218 The EIS for the plan analyzed the effects of
timber sales on inventoried roadless areas, including the Twin Sisters RARE
II area, but it failed to include a discussion of any roadless areas not
inventoried as part of RARE II.219 The Forest Service issued an EA for the
Gatorson timber sale in 1992, concluding the sale would have no significant
environmental effects beyond what the agency disclosed in its 1988 Forest
Plan EIS.220

supra note 33, at 1055 (noting that agency development plans “against wilderness will
presumably be subject to NEPA obligations”).
213 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 4 F.3d at 837; Gippert & DeWitte, supra note 204. But see KleinRobbehaar, supra note 205, at 202 (arguing that “[b]y relying on NEPA, the Ninth Circuit
surmounted provisions in the OWA which preclude judicial review of Forest Service
decisions”).
214 See Smith v. U.S. Forest Serv., 33 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1994).
215 See id. at 1078–79.
216 Id. at 1073. The Forest Service issued a forest plan for the Colville National Forest in
1988. Id. at 1075. The accompanying EIS analyzed the effects of timber sales proposed in the
plan on inventoried roadless areas, including the Twin Sisters RARE II area. Id. The EIS did not
describe the Conn Merkel Area other than to identify it as “roaded.” Id. The timber sales were
located in the Gatorson Planning Area of the forest. Id. at 1074. The western half of the planning
area comprised part of the Twin Sisters RARE II area, while the eastern half occupied part of
the Conn Merkel Area, a large parcel of uninventoried land. Id.
217 Id. at 1074. The timber sales were located in the Gatorson Planning Area of the forest, the
western half of which comprised part of the inventoried Twin Sisters RARE II area while the
eastern half occupied part of the Conn Merkel Area, a 6,737-acre tract of uninventoried land
bisected by an unpaved jeep trail. Id. With the passage of the Washington State Wilderness Act
(WSWA), Congress released the Twin Sisters Area for nonwilderness use. Id. at 1074;
Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-339, 98 Stat. 299 (1984). While the
Forest Service authorized road building and logging in some parts of the Twin Sisters Area, at
the time the complaint was filed, roughly 2,000 acres bordering the Conn Merkel Area remained
roadless. See Smith, 33 F.3d 1072, 1076–77.
218 See Smith, 33 F.3d 1072, 1075. The accompanying EIS analyzed the effects of timber sales
proposed in the plan on inventoried roadless areas, including the Twin Sisters RARE II area, but
the EIS did not describe the Conn Merkel Area other than to identify it as “roaded.” Id.
219 Id. at 1074–75.
220 Id. at 1075.
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Smith argued the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to adequately
address the effect of the timber sale on 6,000 acres of roadless lands,221
maintaining that the agency’s assessment was flawed for two primary
reasons.222 First, the area affected by the timber sale contained a roadless
5,000 acre parcel of uninventoried land, and Smith claimed the Forest
Service may not authorize development in such areas without considering
and publicly disclosing their wilderness values.223 The Forest Service
contended the area was not roadless because it was bisected by a jeep road,
which split the area into two parcels of less than 5,000 acres each, and
therefore NEPA did not require wilderness consideration before authorizing
logging of the area.224 The district court upheld the Forest Service’s position
that it did not need to consider the wilderness option prior to approving the
sale.225 The Ninth Circuit affirmed on this ground, refusing to second-guess
the Forest Service on the question of whether the jeep trail was a “road.”226
Smith’s second NEPA allegation, concerning the Forest Service’s failure
to consider the effects of the logging on a separate, partially inventoried,
roadless area exceeding 5,000 acres in size, met with success.227 The Forest
Service claimed that because part of the 5,000 acre parcel already had been
inventoried and released to nonwilderness uses, the Washington State
Wilderness Act of 1984 (WSWA) precluded judicial review.228 The Ninth
Circuit explained that it rejected similar arguments made by the Forest
Service in National Audubon, reversed the district court, and held that NEPA
required the agency to consider the effect of the proposed logging on the
roadless area even though it included some uninventoried land.229 The court

221 Id. Smith also argued that because the uninventoried Conn Merkel Area was a roadless
area of more than 5,000 acres, the WSWA required the Forest Service to consider designating
the area as wilderness before authorizing logging or other development. Id.
222 Id. at 1073, 1077.
223 Id. at 1073–74 “Under the WSWA, the Forest Service is required to consider the
wilderness option prior to authorizing development in a roadless area only if 1) the area was not
inventoried pursuant to RARE II; and 2) the area is larger than 5,000 acres in size.”).
224 Id. at 1073, 1077. The Forest Service defined “roadless areas” as any areas “within which
there are no improved roads maintained for travel by means of motorized vehicles intended for
highway use.” Id. at 1076.
225 Id. at 1075.
226 Id. at 1077. Refusing to substitute its own judgment for the Forest Service’s
determination that the unpaved jeep road was a road “maintained for vehicles intended for
highway use,” the court ruled that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Forest Service to
determine the jeep trail was a road, and the area was therefore not “roadless.” Id. at 1073, 1077.
The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Smith’s challenge to the Forest
Service’s decision not to consider the wilderness option for the Conn Merkel Area in the EIS
because the area was not roadless. Id.
227 Id. at 1073, 1077.
228 Id. at 1077–78. Smith argued the WSWA did not excuse the agency from considering the
effect of a logging project on the roadless character of inventoried lands and did not preclude a
court from reviewing the agency’s failure to do so. Id. at 1077.
229 Id. at 1073. The district court, denying Smith’s request for an injunction, held the WSWA
precluded judicial review of the Forest Service’s actions involving partially inventoried land that
Congress previously released for nonwilderness use. Id.; see supra notes 206–13 and
accompanying text (discussing National Audubon).
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acknowledged that the WSWA barred review of the wilderness option, but
agreed with Smith that the statute did not excuse the agency from
considering the effect of logging on the roadless character of the land, which
had separate environmental significance.230 Even though Congress may
release lands for nonwilderness uses, NEPA still requires agencies to
address adverse effects that may “irreversibly and irretrievably” alter the
roadless character of the landscape.231
The Forest Service argued that it complied with NEPA by addressing
specific environmental resources in the Gatorson plan area, even if it did not
specifically refer to the area’s roadless character.232 The court nevertheless
ruled that the NEPA documents were inadequate because they failed to take
into account the roadless areas surrounding the Gatorson plan area,
reasoning that NEPA required the Forest Service to address adverse effects
on the entire roadless expanse.233 The court ruled the timber sales could not
proceed until the Forest Service first complied with NEPA by considering
the effects of the proposed logging on roadless areas, confirming that
roadlessness is an environmental condition an agency must consider during
NEPA analysis, regardless of whether Congress made a determination as to
the wilderness status of the land.
Following Smith, the Ninth Circuit continued to recognize that NEPA
required the Forest Service to analyze impacts of logging on all roadless
areas, even if the roadless areas did not meet the statutory requirement for
wilderness, because roadlessness itself is a unique environmental condition.
For example, in Sierra Club, Inc. v. Austin,234 environmental groups sued the
Forest Service, alleging the EIS for a postburn project did not adequately
analyze the effects of logging on roadless-in-fact areas.235 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service, but the Ninth
Circuit reversed,236 concluding that the agency violated NEPA by not taking a
“hard look” at the environmental impact of logging on unroaded areas.237 The
court explained that although the EIS thoroughly analyzed the project’s

230
231

Smith, 33 F.3d 1072,1077–78.
See id. at 1078. The court then provided an additional justification for requiring the

Forest Service to address the environmental consequences of logging roadless areas: the
potential for future wilderness designation of the roadless area. Id. The court explained that the
WSWA did not permanently foreclose judicial review of the wilderness option and, in fact, the
wilderness option for inventoried lands could be revisited in second-generation forest plans. Id.
at 1078–79.
232
233

Id.
Id. The court also ruled that NEPA required the Forest Service to disclose the fact that

the inventoried and uninventoried roadless lands in the sale area comprised a 5,000 acre
roadless expanse, thus meeting the statutory requirement for wilderness designation. Id. The
court noted, however, that “an EIS may not be per se required” for a timber sale “proposed on
inventoried land,” but it left to the agency “the decision of how best to comply with NEPA and
its implementing regulations.” Id. at 1079.
234 82 Fed. App’x 570 (9th Cir. 2003).
235 Id. at 572–73.
236 Id. at 573.
237 Id. (“The Forest Service failed to address the effects of logging in the unroaded areas on
their characteristics vis-à-vis potential for future wilderness or IRA designation.”).
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potential effect on inventoried roadless areas, the discussion of the impact
on other roadless areas was “superficial and largely conclusory.”238 The court
also faulted the agency for not considering the project’s impact on the
potential for roadless areas to be designated as “inventoried roadless areas”
or wilderness in the future.239 The court ruled that NEPA required the Forest
Service to consider the effects of logging unroaded areas, even those not
previously included in the Forest Service inventory, because such areas
contain unique values that would be irreversibly and irretrievably affected
by logging. 240
In Lands Council v. Martin,241 the Ninth Circuit seemingly expanded the
scope of Smith by requiring NEPA analyses to include effects on roadless
areas less than 5,000 acres in size.242 After thousands of acres of forest
burned in a 2005 fire, the Forest Service proposed to log portions of two
uninventoried roadless areas.243 Lands Council, citing Smith, argued that the
Forest Service’s EIS on the salvage logging project violated NEPA by failing
to include an adequate discussion of the effects of the proposed logging on
the roadless areas, primarily the potential wilderness designation of the area
that the project would foreclose.244 The Forest Service attempted to
distinguish the situation from Smith, claiming that the case did not apply
because the lands at issue in Lands Council consisted of uninventoried
parcels less than 5,000 acres in size and therefore did not meet the criteria
for wilderness.245 The district court granted summary judgment to the Forest
Service,246 but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that NEPA required the
Forest Service to consider the effects of proposed logging on the roadless
areas.247
Declining to accept the Forest Service’s argument, the Ninth Circuit
concluded the Upper Cummins Creek roadless area was “indistinguishable
from the roadless area at issue in Smith.”248 The court determined the Upper
Cummins Creek roadless area, combined with the adjacent Willow Springs

238
239
240

Id.
Id.
Id.

241

529 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008).
See infra notes 251–252 and accompanying text.
243 Lands Council, 529 F.3d at 1222. The two areas were the West Tucannon roadless area
(4,284 acres) and the Upper Cummins Creek roadless area (966 acres), both of which were
situated adjacent to the Willow Springs inventoried roadless area (containing more than 12,000
acres). Although a road separated the West Tucannon and Willow Springs areas, the Upper
Cummins Creek and Willow Springs comprised a contiguous “roadless expanse of more than
13,000 acres.” Id. at 1222, 1230 (“referring to a contiguous area comprised of an uninventoried
roadless area and an inventoried roadless area as a ‘roadless expanse’” (citing Smith, 33 F.3d
1072, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 1994))).
244 Id. at 1230 (citing Smith, 33 F.3d at 1078–79).
245 Id. at 1230–31 (noting that Smith involved roadless areas larger than 5,000 acres in size).
246 Id. at 1224.
247 Id. at 1232. But see League of Wilderness Defenders-Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project
v. Martin, No. 2:10-CV-1346-BR, 2011 WL 2493765, at *5, *7 (D. Or. June 23, 2011) (considering
Smith, but deferring to Forest Service decision to prepare an EA instead of an EIS).
248 Lands Council, 529 F.3d. at 1231.
242
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inventoried roadless area, formed a “roadless expanse” exceeding 5,000
acres in size.249 Following Smith, the court concluded that logging the Upper
Cummins Creek area, in combination with the contiguous Willow Springs
inventoried roadless area, required NEPA analysis.250
The Ninth Circuit also ruled that Smith applied to “roadless areas that
are either greater than 5,000 acres or of a ‘sufficient size’ within the meaning
of” the Wilderness Act.251 The court explained:
“[The] Wilderness Act does not limit the potential for wilderness designation to
roadless areas 5,000 acres or larger. . . . [A]n area is suitable for wilderness
designation if it meets several requirements, including the area ‘has at least five
thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its
252
preservation and use in an unimpaired condition.’”

Because the area was of sufficient size to be preserved as wilderness, the
court concluded that NEPA required the Forest Service to discuss the effects
of the logging on the roadless character of the uninventoried 4,284 acre West
Tucannon roadless area.253

B. The Forest Service’s Roadless Rule
Between the completion of RARE II in 1979 and 2000, the Forest
Service built roads on an estimated 2.8 million acres of inventoried roadless
lands released for nonwilderness use.254 In October 1999, President Clinton
sought to protect remaining roadless areas from additional road building and
ordered the Forest Service to prepare an administrative rule addressing road
building in roadless areas.255 The agency responded by issuing a nationwide
rule protecting 58.5 million acres of inventoried roadless areas, nearly onethird of national forest lands, from future road building and directing that
such areas be “managed in a manner that sustains their values now and for

249

Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1231.
251 Id.
252 Id. (citing Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006)).
253 Id.
254 Monica Voicu, At a Dead End: The Need for Congressional Direction in the Roadless
Area Management Debate, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 487, 505–06 (2010).
250

255 President Clinton directed the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations
providing “appropriate long-term protection for most or all of the currently inventoried
‘roadless’ areas, and to determine whether such protection is warranted for any smaller
roadless areas not yet inventoried.” Memorandum from President Clinton to the Secretary of
Agriculture, (Oct. 13, 1999), available at http://usgovinfo.about.com/blroadless.htm; Martin Nie,
Administrative Rulemaking and Public Lands Conflict: The Forest Service’s Roadless Rule, 44
NAT. RESOURCES J. 687, 700–01 (2004); Voicu, supra note 254, at 506. Even before President
Clinton issued his directive, Forest Service Chief Michael Dombeck temporarily suspended new
road construction in inventoried roadless areas, largely because roadless area issues were being
frequently litigated and road maintenance on Forest Service lands was becoming increasingly
expensive. Nie, supra note 255, at 699–700.
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future generations.”256 The Roadless Rule also limited timber harvest in
roadless areas and effectively prescribed a dominant preservation use.257
The Roadless Rule was controversial from the start, with many critics
arguing that decisions involving road building be made during forest
planning under NFMA.258 Opponents, including resource extraction interests
and local governments, sued to enjoin implementation of the rule.259 In the
first of these suits, Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman,260 the Kootenai Tribe
of Idaho, along with timber companies, local and state governments, and
recreational groups, challenged the rule, claiming it violated NEPA.261 They
alleged the EIS did not comply with NEPA because the Forest Service
considered an impermissibly narrow range of alternatives to the Roadless
Rule and failed to address the cumulative effects of the alternatives.262
The federal court for the District of Idaho agreed that the range of
alternatives was too narrow and enjoined the Forest Service from
implementing the 2001 Roadless Rule, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

256 Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,244–45, 3,247 (Jan. 12, 2001)
(codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294) [hereinafter Roadless Rule]; Voicu, supra note 254, at 506–07;
MICHAEL P. DOMBECK ET AL., FROM CONQUEST TO CONSERVATION: OUR PUBLIC LANDS LEGACY 93
(2003). Dan Glickman, then Secretary of Agriculture, signed the Roadless Rule on January 12,
2001. Id.; see also PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RES. SERV., NO. 30647, THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM
ROADLESS AREAS INITIATIVE 2 (2002), available at http://azstateparks.com/ohv/
downloads/OHV_2006_Roadless_Report.pdf (explaining that the Roadless Rule was “issued in
light of the importance of the roadless areas for various forest management purposes and to the
American public, and because addressing projects in roadless areas on a forest-by-forest basis
as part of the planning process was resulting in controversy, conflict, and the expenditure of a
great deal of time and expense on appeals and litigation”).
257 Roadless Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3,249; see BALDWIN, supra note 256, at 6 (identifying the
limited exceptions to the Roadless Rule). The Roadless Rule allowed timber harvest and other
activities so long as they did not require the construction of new roads. Roadless Rule, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 3,244; Voicu, supra note 254, at 507.
258 See Nie, supra note 255, at 704–05. Almost immediately after President Bush took office,
his Chief of Staff postponed for 60 days most regulations that the Clinton Administration had
published but which had not taken effect. Id. at 705; Voicu, supra note 254, at 507–08
(discussing the Bush Administration’s actions implementing the Roadless Rule). While litigation
over the Roadless Rule was pending, the Bush administration reopened public comment on the
rule and later issued the State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management Rule (“State
Petitions Rule”), effectively overturning the Roadless Rule by opening inventoried roadless
areas to road development. See Nie, supra note 255, at 705; Kyle J. Aarons, Note, The Real
World Roadless Rules Challenges, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2011) (citing State Petitions for
Inventoried Roadless Area Management, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,654 (May 13, 2005) (codified at C.F.R.
pt. 294)); see also Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions: Roadless Area
Management under the Clinton and Bush Administrations, 34 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1153–54 (2004)
(describing the State Petitions Rule).
259 See Earthjustice, Timeline of the Roadless Rule, http://earthjustice.org/features/timelineof-the-roadless-rule (last visited Apr. 12, 2014) (presenting a timeline of significant events in the
evolution of the Roadless Rule and subsequent litigation).
260 313 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002).
261 Id. (The plaintiffs also alleged Administrative Procedure Act violations not discussed
here). Because the appeal took place after the Clinton Administration left office, and the
Roadless Rule was not supported by the Bush Administration, environmental groups provided
the only defense of the rule. See Zellmer, supra note 71, at 1077–78.
262 See 313 F.3d at 1120, 1123.
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reversed.263 The EIS considered three alternatives, each of which would ban
road construction within roadless areas.264 The Ninth Circuit explained that it
was reasonable for the Forest Service to limit its consideration to
alternatives that banned roads in roadless areas because the purpose of the
Roadless Rule was to protect the ecological and social characteristics of
such areas.265 The court also suggested that NEPA’s mandate to analyze
alternative actions applied “less stringently” when a proposed action
promotes environmental protection, and so the Forest Service did not need
to analyze alternatives that undermined the objective of the rule.266 The court
recognized NEPA’s policy—to protect the natural environment—and opined
that the statute “may not be used to preclude lawful conservation measures
by the Forest Service . . . in contravention of their own policy objectives, to
develop and degrade scarce environmental resources”267 because it would
“turn NEPA on its head to interpret the statute to require that the Forest
Service conduct in-depth analyses of environmentally damaging alternatives
that are inconsistent with the Forest Service’s conservation policy
objectives.”268
After determining that the Forest Service considered an adequate range
of alternatives, the court lifted the district court’s injunction prohibiting

263 Id. at 1104, 1120. The district court also ruled that the Forest Service failed to provide the
public with a meaningful opportunity to comment on the rule by not adequately identifying the
roadless areas and by not allowing sufficient time for the comment period. Id. at 1116–19; see
Nie, supra note 255, at 704.
264 313 F.3d at 1120.
265 Id. at 1120–21. The court noted that the Forest Service may not define the objectives
underlying the NEPA analysis in “unreasonably narrow terms,” but concluded that there was no
indication the Forest Service did so in the case of the roadless rule; instead, the court explained
that “protecting the roadless areas . . . from further degradation can hardly be termed
unreasonably narrow.” Id. at 1122.
266 Id. at 1120 (reasoning that the “NEPA alternatives requirement must be interpreted less
stringently when the proposed agency action has a primary and central purpose to conserve and
protect the natural environment, rather than to harm it.”).

The Ninth Circuit concluded:
[T]he conservation and preventative goals of the Forest Service in promulgating the
Roadless Rule are entirely consistent with the policy objectives of NEPA, as well as with
the Forest Service’s own mission. . . . NEPA may not be used to preclude lawful
conservation measures by the Forest Service and to force federal agencies, in
contravention of their own policy objectives, to develop and degrade scarce
environmental resources. The Forest Service, as steward of our priceless national
forests, is in the best position, after hearing from the public, to assess whether current
roads adequately aid forest management practices and whether a general ban on new
roads in roadless areas of national forest serves appropriate conservation and budgetary
interests.
Id. at 1122–23.
267 Id. at 1123.
268 Id. at 1122; see also Zellmer, supra note 71, at 1078 (noting the court’s decision meant “an
injunction was not warranted, and in fact flew in the face of the strong public interest ‘in
preserving precious, unreplenishable resources . . . and in preserving our national forests in
their natural state.’”).
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implementation of the roadless rule.269 The court’s decision in Kootenai Tribe
reinstated the Roadless Rule, but an additional legal challenge was pending
in the Tenth Circuit.
In 2001, the State of Wyoming filed its own suit challenging the
Roadless Rule and, in 2003, a Wyoming federal district court, concluding that
the Forest Service violated both NEPA and the Wilderness Act, enjoined the
rule.270 Environmental interveners appealed, but the case was mooted by the
Forest Service’s adoption of the State Petitions Rule.271 Then, in 2006, a
federal district court in California struck down the State Petitions Rule for
violating NEPA and the ESA, effectively reinstating the Roadless Rule.272 At
this point, Wyoming renewed its challenge to the Roadless Rule in 2007, and
on August 12, 2008, the Wyoming district court again ruled that the Forest
Service violated the Wilderness Act and NEPA in promulgating the rule.273
The district court issued a permanent nationwide injunction, and the Forest
Service and environmental groups appealed.274 However, in 2011, the Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the validity of the Roadless
Rule.275 The court concluded that the Forest Service acted within its
authority pursuant to NEPA, the Wilderness Act, and other statutes.276
Although the Tenth Circuit did not expressly adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning concerning the reduced scope of alternatives required by NEPA
for conservation actions,277 it reached the same result. The court concluded
the three alternatives that the Forest Service examined in promulgating the
Roadless Rule was a reasonable range of alternatives,278 and the Forest
Service could ignore alternatives which did not further the agency’s declared

269 Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, 313 F.3d at 1123. The court also reversed the district court on
the issue of cumulative effects, agreeing with the environmental groups that the potential
cumulative effects of the Roadless Rule were “too speculative to be amenable to in-depth
analysis in the EIS.” Id.
270 Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1231–32, 1239 (D. Wyo. 2003),
vacated, 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005) (ruling that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing
to consider all reasonable alternatives, conducting an inadequate cumulative impacts analysis,
and by failing to prepare a supplemental EIS to address new information).
271 See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1318 (D. Wyo. 2008), rev’d, 661
F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2011) (describing the history of Roadless Rule litigation in Wyoming).
272 California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874, 908–09, 918–19
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (ruling that NEPA required preparation of a programmatic EIS because the
State Petitions Rule fundamentally changed the manner in which roadless areas were protected
and used).
273 Wyoming, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
274 Id. at 1345, 1354; Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209, 1220 (10th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 144 (2012) (petition by intervenor Colorado Mining Association), and
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 417 (2012) (petition by Wyoming).
275 Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1272.
276 Id. at 1266, 1272 (alleging violations of the Organic Act, MUSYA, and NFMA in
promulgating the rule); see Talasi Brooks, Wyoming v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 661 F.3d
1209 (10th Cir. 2011), 33 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 181, 184–85 (2012) (discussing the
court’s opinion in Wyoming v. U.S.Dep’t of Agric.).
277 See supra notes 263–68 and accompanying text.
278 See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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purpose and need for the rule.279 The Tenth Circuit also upheld the rule
against several other NEPA challenges.280
NEPA played a significant role in upholding the 2001 Roadless Rule,
permitting the Forest Service to implement nationwide protection for nearly
sixty million acres of roadless lands, providing significant administrative
protection for potential wilderness areas and areas with wilderness
characteristics that were ignored by Congress.281

C. NEPA and BLM Wilderness Study Areas
Wilderness study areas (WSAs) on federal lands managed by the BLM
are a particularly controversial part of public land law. The Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) requires BLM to manage these
potential wilderness lands so as not to impair their suitability for wilderness
designation,282 a stringent management standard. FLPMA also requires BLM
279 Wyoming, 661 F3d at 1245–46 (concluding that “the Forest Service’s decision to limit the
alternatives considered in detail to those that focused on restrictions on road construction and
timber harvest . . . was reasonable in light of its conclusion, based on ample evidence presented
in the EIS, that these activities posed the greatest risk of destroying the characteristics of IRAs,
which the proposed rule was intended to protect and preserve”).
280 The court also concluded that: 1) the scoping period complied with NEPA; 2) the Forest
Service’s decision not to provide detailed maps of the affected areas did not deny Wyoming the
opportunity to meaningfully participate in the scoping process; 3) the Forest Service acted
within its discretion in refusing to grant cooperating status to Wyoming; 4) the Forest Service
adequately considered the cumulative effects of the Roadless Rule; 5) NEPA did not require the
agency to prepare a supplemental EIS based on changes it made between the draft and final
EISs; 6) NEPA did not require a site-specific analysis for each forest affected by the Rule; and 7)
the Forest Service did not impermissibly avoid taking a hard look at its actions by
predetermining the outcome of the rulemaking. Id. at 1238–66.
281 On March 25, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the final
legal challenge to the Roadless Rule after concluding the suit was barred by the six-year statute
of limitations for challenges to federal regulations. Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 932 F. Supp. 2d
30, 31 (D.C Cir. 2013); see Earthjustice, Roadless Rule Survives Final Legal Challenge,
http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2013/roadless-rule-survives-final-legal-challenge (last visited
Apr. 12, 2014). The Roadless Rule now applies in all states except Idaho and Colorado, where
separate roadless rules apply. See Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to
the National Forests in Idaho, 73 Fed. Reg. 1,135, 1,137 (Jan. 7, 2008) (codified at 36 C.F.R. part
294); Jayne v. Sherman, 706 F.3d 994, 1009 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding the Idaho Roadless Rule);
Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the National Forests in Colorado, 77
Fed. Reg. 39,576 (July 3, 2012).
282 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (2006). FLPMA
directed the Secretary of the Interior to review BLM lands, identify areas meeting wilderness
criteria, and make wilderness designation recommendations to the President by October 1991,
15 years after its enactment. Id. § 1782(a); COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1056. FLPMA also
directed the President to make his recommendations to Congress within two years of receiving
wilderness recommendations from the Secretary and provided that Congress may then act to
designate as wilderness the lands it deems appropriate. 43 U.S.C.§ 1782(b) (2006). In the interim
between the BLM’s review of lands identified as having wilderness characteristics and
Congress’s final decision regarding wilderness designation, the BLM must generally manage all
reviewed lands “so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness,”
whether or not it believes them to be suitable for such preservation. Id. § 1782(c). The BLM
refers to the lands managed under this “nonimpairment” standard as “wilderness study areas”
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to “take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation”
of BLM lands, including WSAs.283
Sierra Club v. Hodel (Hodel I)284 involved a challenge by several
environmental organizations to a proposed county road improvement
project passing through federal lands in Garfield County in southern Utah.285
Garfield County proposed to improve twenty-eight miles of the so-called
Burr Trail from a one-lane dirt road into a two-lane gravel road.286 Portions of
the stretch of the Burr Trail bisected the Steep Creek and North Escalante
Canyons WSAs.287 The Sierra Club, concerned that changes to the road and
the resulting increase in traffic would “impair the naturalness and the
solitude” of the affected area,288 sued federal officials and Garfield County,
hoping to permanently enjoin the proposed construction.289 The Sierra Club
alleged that the road improvement would “unnecessarily and unduly
degrade” the WSAs adjacent to the road and would impair the WSAs’

(“WSAs”). Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 59 (2004). BLM’s initial
public lands inventory reviewed close to 174 million acres and identified 919 WSAs
encompassing nearly 24 million acres. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 1057.
283 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006).
284 675 F. Supp. 594 (D. Utah 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988),
overruled on other grounds by Los Ranchos, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992).
285 Hodel II, 848 F.2d at 1073.
286 Id. Public use of the Burr trail included driving livestock to market in the late 1800s and
early 1900s as well as oil exploration around 1918. Id. Beginning in the 1930s the road supported
various uses, including transportation, tourism, agriculture, and economic development, all
facilitated by County maintenance of the road beginning in the early 1940s. Id. According to the
Tenth Circuit, “[t]he combination of public uses and county maintenance has created a right-ofway in favor of Garfield County, pursuant to Congress’ grant of public land in R.S. 2477.” Id.
(citing An Act granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and
for other Purposes, 14 Stat. 251 (1866)) (granting rights of way for highways over public lands).
Congress passed Revised Statute 2477 as part of the mining laws of 1866 to encourage
settlement and economic development. Hodel I, 675 F. Supp. at 601–02; see Harry R. Bader,
Potential Legal Standards for Resolving the R.S. 2477 Right of Way Crisis, 11 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 485, 486 (1994).
R.S. 2477 was self-executing: An R.S. 2477 right of way would come into existence
automatically if a highway was constructed across unreserved public lands. Hodel II, 848 F.2d at
1078. (“[A] right-of-way could be obtained without application to, or approval by, the federal
government. Instead, the grant referred to in R.S. 2477 became effective upon the construction
or establishing of highways, in accordance with the state laws”). But see Tova Wolking, From

Blazing Trails to Building Highways: SUWA v. BLM & Ancient Easements over Federal Public
Lands, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1067, 1067 (2007) (“[R]esolution of [R.S. 2477] claims has become a
complex issue, rife with uncertainty about which access routes are valid and which areas of
land are affected”). More than 100 years after passing the 1866 mining laws, Congress repealed
R.S. 2477 in FLPMA. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006); see also Bret C. Birdsong, Road Rage and R.S.
2477: Judicial and Administrative Responsibility for Resolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 523, 529–30 (2005) (discussing the effects of FLPMA’s passage on R.S. 2477 rights
of way); Alexander H. Southwell, Comment, The County Supremacy Movement: The Federalism
Implications of a 1990s States’ Rights Battle, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 417, 435 (1996) (explaining that
R.S. 2477 rights-of-way claims have become an important tool for wilderness opponents and
have sparked many of the cases involving interim protection of potential wilderness areas).
287 Hodel II, 848 F.2d at 1073.
288 Hodel I, 675 F. Supp. at 596.
289 Hodel II, 848 F.2d at 1073–74.
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suitability for future designation as wilderness and that the BLM violated
NEPA by failing to study the environmental impact of the road project.290
A Utah district court, concluding that the project was within the
County’s right-of-way, authorized the road construction but ordered the BLM
to ensure that the project did not unnecessarily degrade adjacent WSAs.291
The court, reasoning that road work in the riparian area known as “The
Gulch” would “unreasonably or unduly degrade” the adjacent WSA,292
determined that the road needed to be relocated to an area outside the
County’s right-of-way and ordered the County to apply for a FLPMA permit
from BLM.293
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court, first determining that
the BLM’s refusal to act was reviewable,294 and then concluding that NEPA
applied and that the BLM had a duty to ensure the road project did not
unduly or unnecessarily degrade areas adjacent to the WSAs.295 Although
declining to adopt the district court’s reasoning, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
district court’s determination that the road construction proposal triggered
NEPA’s requirements.296 The court recognized that relocation of the road
from the existing right-of-way would trigger NEPA because of BLM’s
290 Id. The Sierra Club also alleged that the proposed road improvements would extend
beyond the county’s right-of-way and encroach on federal land, and that the county needed to
obtain a permit from the BLM as a result of the encroachment. Id.; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c)
(2006) (“In managing the public lands the Secretary shall by regulation or otherwise take any
action required to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands and their resources or
to afford environmental protection.”) (emphasis added).
291 Hodel II, 848 F.2d at 1074.
292 According to the record, effects of the work proposed in The Gulch extended for nearly a
mile and were likely to affect 3,430 acres of the North Escalante Canyons WSA. Id. at 1088. The
court determined that the proposed project would not unduly or unnecessarily degrade the
WSAs except for work in The Gulch. See, id. (explaining that the district court, based on BLM
testimony, concluded “there would be less degradation of the WSA if the road were moved on to
the adjacent bench located on BLM land”).
293 Hodel I, 675 F. Supp. at 611 (“[W]ork in the riparian area of The Gulch will have an
impact on the WSA sufficient to invoke the FLPMA requirement that all work done be the least
degrading alternative . . . [m]oving the road out of the [exiting right-of-way in The Gulch onto
BLM land outside of the right-of-way] will result in less disturbance to [the WSAs]”). Although
no permit was needed for the work in the existing County right-of-way, the court concluded that
the County needed a BLM FLPMA permit to relocate the road on BLM land. See id. (holding
“FLPMA requires the county to apply for . . . a permit and to work with the BLM to develop the
least degrading alternative for The Gulch”).
294 Hodel II, 848 F.2d at 1075. BLM asserted that its decision not to regulate the County’s
proposal was exempt from judicial review because it fell under the category of investigative or
enforcement actions committed to agency discretion by law. Id. at 1074. The court disagreed,
determining that BLM’s actions were reviewable because FLPMA provided a legal standard that
the court could apply. Id. at 1075. The court determined that unlike other discretionary
enforcement actions, FLPMA imposed a duty on BLM to “take any action required to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation” and to “define and protect ‘roadless’ areas,” and guided by
those standards, the court determined it was capable of judging whether a WSA remains
roadless or public lands and rights-of-way boundaries are breached. Id.
295 Id. at 1090.
296 Id. (explaining that the district court erred in ruling that BLM’s actions in monitoring the
project to ensure the proposal did not exceed the scope of the R.S. 2477 right-of-way
constituted a “major federal action”).
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authority under FLPMA to regulate rights-of-way on public lands,297 while
also holding that BLM’s duty to prevent undue and unnecessary degradation
of the WSAs triggered NEPA.298 The court, reasoning that “[t]he touchstone
of major federal action . . . is an agency’s authority to influence significant
nonfederal activity,” concluded that the BLM’s “responsibility to impose an
alternative it deems less degrading upon the nonfederal actor” was sufficient
to invoke NEPA.299
Reading NEPA and FLPMA’s undue degradation standard together, the
Tenth Circuit reasoned that the road improvement’s effect on the WSAs not
only triggered NEPA’s requirement to evaluate alternatives, but imposed a
duty to select the alternative that would produce the least adverse
environmental effects, reasoning that “[w]hen a proposed road improvement
will impact a WSA the agency has the duty . . . to determine whether there
are less degrading alternatives.”300 The result seemed to endorse a kind of
substantive NEPA, which environmentalists have long sought.301

297
298

See id.
Id. at 1090–91 (“BLM’s duty under FLPMA . . . to prevent unnecessary degradation of

WSAs from . . . changes in the right-of-way, injects an element of federal control for required
action that elevates this situation to one of major federal action [triggering NEPA]”).
299 Id. at 1089–91.
300 Id. at 1090 (“[W]hile BLM may not deny improvements because they impair WSAs, it
retains a duty to see that they do not unduly degrade.”). Citing a BLM interim management
policy for lands under wilderness review, the court explained that “when a proposed road
improvement will impact a WSA the agency has the duty under FLPMA § 603(c) and the
regulation to determine whether there are less degrading alternatives, and it has the
responsibility to impose an alternative it deems less degrading upon the nonfederal actor.” Id. at
1090–91 (citing Interim Management Policy and Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,854, 31,855 (1983))
(quoting BLM policy regulation as stating “[w]hen it is determined that the rights conveyed can
be exercised only through activities that will impair wilderness suitability, the activities will be
regulated to prevent unnecessary and undue degradation.”).
301 See Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA,
88 HARV. L. REV. 735, 748–49 (1975) (proposing that “[s]o long as environmentally preferable
alternatives to a proposed project are available . . . [NEPA] requires that the least adverse
alternative be selected.”); David B. Lawrenz, Judicial Review Under the National Environmental
Policy Act: What Remains After Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council?, 62 U. COLO. L.
REV. 899, 931 (1991) (arguing that in order “[t]o restore the vigor” of NEPA, Congress should
modify the statute to clarify that “NEPA’s concern for protecting the environment is mandatory,
not precatory”); Marion D. Miller, The National Environmental Policy Act and Judicial Review

After Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council and Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources
Council, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 223, 255 (1991) (suggesting that the addition of “substantive
provisions to NEPA is an obvious first step towards heightened protection of the
environment”).
The Supreme Court’s ensuing decision in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Ass’n
(SUWA), 542 U.S. 55 (2004), may raise some questions about the continuing vitality of the Tenth
Circuit’s Hodel decision. In SUWA, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that neither NEPA nor
FLPMA required BLM to regulate off-road vehicle use in WSAs in Utah. See id. at 67, 72. Holding
that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes a court to “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” only where there is a “discrete” agency action,
such as a permit issuance or rulemaking, that is legally required, the court concluded that
general noncompliance with FLPMA’s nonimpairment mandate “lack[s] the specificity requisite
for agency action.” Id. at 62–63, 65–67. The Court decided that BLM had discretion to determine
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Reversing the district court, the Tenth Circuit also ruled that BLM
violated NEPA by authorizing the county’s proposed improvements without
giving proper consideration to how the project might affect WSAs.302 The
court decided that NEPA required the BLM to analyze the environmental
effects of the proposed project before allowing construction to proceed, and
that the district court erred when determining the record supported a finding
of no significant impact.303

D. NEPA, Land Plans, and Wilderness Characteristics
Many acres of public lands with wilderness characteristics are not
within wilderness areas or even within WSAs. NEPA has an important role in
identifying the wilderness qualities of these lands and encouraging their
protection. Some of these possibilities were evident in Oregon Natural
Desert Association (ONDA) v. BLM,304 in which environmental groups sued
BLM for failing to comply with NEPA in revising a BLM land plan for 4.5
million acres of public lands in Southeastern Oregon.305 ONDA alleged BLM
how best to comply with FLPMA’s requirement that it prevent “impairment” of WSAs, and
therefore the agency could not be compelled to ban ORV use. Id. at 72.
The outcome and reasoning of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Hodel is distinguishable
from the Supreme Court’s determination in SUWA While SUWA considered whether to compel
the BLM to regulate ORV use in WSAs, Hodel involved right-of-way work requiring a FLPMA
permit from BLM, a discrete action under the Court’s reasoning in SUWA. See SUWA, 542 U.S.
at 62–63; Hodel I, 675 F. Supp. 594, 611 (D. Utah 1987). Although the Hodel court determined
BLM’s actions were reviewable because FLPMA’s unnecessary degradation mandate imposed a
definite standard on the agency, rights-of-way on public lands are subject to section 505 of
FLPMA, and the issuance of a section 505 permit is a discrete action, reviewable for compliance
with federal statutes and regulations consistent with SUWA. See Hodel I, 675 F. Supp. at 611.;
Hodel II, 848 F.2d 1068, 1090 (10th Cir. 1988); Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1765 (2006) (requiring right-of-way permits to “include (a) terms and conditions which
will (i) carry out the purposes of [FLPMA]; (ii) minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values
and fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the environment; (iii) require compliance
with applicable air and water quality standards . . . and (iv) require compliance with State
standards for public health and safety, environmental protections . . . and (b) such terms and
conditions as the Secretary concerned deems necessary to . . . require location of the right-ofway along a route that will cause least damage to the environment”). The discretionary action
reviewable in Hodel was considerably different from the facts of SUWA, which involved an
attempt to make BLM carry out a “monitoring and take action” promise in a FLPMA land plan
by claiming that the agency’s inaction violated FLPMA’s nonimpairment mandate. See SUWA
542 U.S. at 60–61.
302 Hodel II, 848 F.2d. at 1096 (remanding to the district court with instructions that BLM
prepare an EA followed by either a finding of no significant impact or an EIS on the
environmental effects of the proposed road project on the WSAs). The district court ruled that
although BLM failed to prepare an EA, the agency nevertheless complied with NEPA because
the evidence in the record was sufficient to support a finding of no significant impact. Hodel I,
675 F. Supp. at 615 (“BLM’s finding of no significant impact was well within the bounds of
reasoned decision-making and is supported by persuasive evidence.”).
303 Hodel II, 848 F.2d. at 1096.
304 No. 03-1017, 2005 WL 711663 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2005), rev’d sub nom. ONDA v. BLM., 531
F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2008), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 625 F.3d 1092
(9th Cir. 2010).
305 See 625 F.3d at 1094–95.
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violated NEPA by failing to adequately analyze the effects of the Southeast
Oregon Resource Management Plan on wilderness characteristics or
consider alternatives for managing wilderness characteristics on non-WSA
land.306 BLM responded that it did not need to address wilderness
characteristics in its land plan or accompanying EIS because it completed its
obligation to consider wilderness characteristics under section 603 of
FLPMA over a decade earlier.307
The district court, agreeing with BLM, held the agency was not “legally
required to perform a wilderness inventory,” and so could not be faulted for
failing in its EIS on the land plan to analyze non-WSA land that might now
have wilderness characteristics, or to discuss management options for such
lands.308 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed, concluding that BLM violated
NEPA by failing to address the existing wilderness characteristics of the
affected lands, regardless of the outcome of wilderness review mandated by
FLPMA.309 The Ninth Circuit largely held that NEPA documents for land use
plans generally must consider the landscape’s wilderness characteristics,
“regardless of whether permanent wilderness preservation is an option,” and
regardless of the requirements of other statutes, including the Wilderness
Act, FLPMA, or individual state wilderness acts concerning potential

306 Id. at 1108. ONDA also claimed that BLM violated NEPA because it failed to adequately
analyze cumulative impacts and alternatives for grazing and vehicle use. Id. ONDA claimed
violations of the Wilderness Act and the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315a–315r, but
the court focused on the NEPA issues and did not address the Wilderness Act or Taylor Grazing
Act claims. Id. Reasoning that because the EIS and land plan were intended to provide the BLM
with a “comprehensive framework for managing public land,” and because wilderness values
and characteristics—not just the legal definition of wilderness—are part of the resources BLM
must consider in the land use planning process, ONDA argued that NEPA required
consideration of wilderness values and characteristics in the EIS. Id. at 1110. ONDA suggested
that the BLM violated NEPA by not providing a “full and fair discussion” of the plan’s
environmental impacts when it failed to discuss non-WSA lands possessing wilderness values.

Id.
307 Id. at 1110–11; see FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006) (requiring BLM to review
wilderness resources on BLM lands and directing the Secretary of the Interior to report to the
President, “from time to time,” his recommendation as to the suitability or nonsuitability of the
inventoried areas for preservation as wilderness). Because BLM completed its FLPMAmandated evaluation and assessment of wilderness values on public lands in 1989 and
submitted recommendations to the Secretary of Interior in October 1991, the agency
determined it no longer needed to consider wilderness issues during routine project planning
pending congressional action. ONDA v. BLM, 625 F.3d at 1101. BLM also asserted that SUWA
barred the court’s review of the EIS, but the Ninth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that completion
of an EIS as part of NEPA analysis constitutes a discrete agency action as required by the
Supreme Court in SUWA. Id. at 1111, 1118.
308 ONDA v. BLM, 625 F.3d at 1108. The district court also concluded that the BLM
sufficiently analyzed cumulative impacts and considered an adequate range of grazing and ORV
alternatives. Id.
309 Id. at 1124. The court’s analysis seemed to suggest that NEPA also required Forest
Service land plans to include consideration of wilderness characteristics. See id. at 1117 (citing
Smith v. U.S. Forest Serv., 33 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1994); Lands Council v. Martin, 479 F.3d
636, 640 (9th Cir. 2007); Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1121 (9th Cir.
2002)) (“[T]here is no reason to suppose that [wilderness] characteristics, when they appear on
BLM land, rather than on Forest Service land, do not implicate the planning process.”).
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wilderness.310 The court consequently enjoined implementation of BLM’s
Southeast Oregon plan until the agency complied with NEPA by addressing
wilderness characteristics in the EIS and considering a range of alternatives,
including closing some areas to all off-road vehicle use.311
ONDA v. BLM marked the first time the Ninth Circuit concluded that
NEPA required a federal land management agency to take wilderness
characteristics into account when revising land plans.312 The decision is
significant because it requires public disclosure of existing wilderness
qualities of public lands periodically at the time of all land plan revisions,
and may prompt the public to demand protection of these lands with
wilderness characteristics.
VI. CONCLUSION
NEPA’s role in wilderness preservation has been largely
underappreciated. In fact, NEPA played a significant role in designating and
protecting the nation’s wilderness and in maintaining the wilderness
qualities of lands that Congress may one day designate as wilderness.
NEPA first imposed its procedures on the Forest Service’s RARE
planning, enjoining release of roadless areas to multiple use management
until the agency publicly disclosed the value of the resources at stake and
considered all reasonable alternatives.313 That effectively remanded the issue
of roadless release versus preservation to Congress, which responded by
passing numerous state wilderness acts for Forest Service lands in the 1980s
and 1990s, more than doubling designated wilderness acres.314 NEPA
proceeded to affect management of wilderness areas in cases involving
timber cutting and recreational uses.315 NEPA also provided some protection
for undesignated lands with wilderness qualities by requiring the Forest
Service to evaluate and publicly disclose large roadless areas it proposed to
log,316 requiring BLM to implement the least damaging alternative to a road
improvement bisecting wilderness study areas,317 and insisting that BLM

310 Id. at 1121 (“BLM misunderstood the role of wilderness characteristics in its land use
planning decisions. . . . [and] wilderness characteristics are a value which, under the FLPMA,
the Bureau has the continuing authority to manage, even after it has fulfilled its . . . duties to
recommend some lands with wilderness characteristics for permanent congressional
protection.”). Even though BLM completed the survey of wilderness characteristics required
pursuant to FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1782, the survey did not satisfy NEPA’s requirement that the
agency consider impacts to wilderness characteristics. Id. at 1111–12.
311 Id. at 1124. Regarding ORV use, the court explained that NEPA required BLM to consider
alternatives that closed significant portions of land to all ORV use, not merely reducing ORV
use. Id. at 1123–24.
312 See supra note 309.
313 See supra notes 82–116 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 117–24 and accompanying text.
315 See supra notes 155–66, 188–-93 (discussing timber cutting), 178–87 (discussing
recreational pack trips) and accompanying text.
316 See supra Part V.A.
317 See supra notes 284–303 and accompanying text.
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identify and consider protecting roadless areas with wilderness
characteristics when revising its land plans.318
NEPA case law concerning wilderness reflects Professor Appel’s sense
that courts give careful scrutiny to agency actions affecting wilderness.319
But the results of this study suggest something more: NEPA and its
procedures and judicial flexibility in interpreting the statute’s requirements
have been the usual vehicles for protecting both designated wilderness areas
and lands with wilderness potential. NEPA has overcome agency claims of
land management expertise; all the cases in this study involve the imposition
of unwanted procedures upon unwilling agencies. In this capacity, NEPA has
functioned as a “common law for the environment,” enabling courts to
flexibly apply NEPA’s procedures to fit the context of the proposed
actions.320
Nowhere is this flexibility better illustrated than in contrasting the
Ninth Circuit’s view of alternatives in reviewing the Forest Service’s
proposed release of lands to multiple use—in which the court thought that
consideration of eight alternatives was insufficient to satisfy NEPA321—with
that same court’s acceptance of a considerably narrower range of
alternatives in upholding the same agency’s Roadless Rule.322 In the latter
case the court was clearly unwilling to have NEPA serve as a barrier to
protecting lands with wilderness qualities, whereas in the former case it
interpreted NEPA procedures to require careful consideration and public
disclosure of costs releasing protected lands to multiple use management.
This contextual approach to NEPA is fully in keeping with its congressional
drafters’ intent that the goal of the statute was to protect and preserve the
quality of the human environment, including wilderness.323 Recognition of
NEPA’s essential role in designating wilderness areas and in protecting lands
with wilderness qualities will serve wilderness well in the next fifty years—
just as it has in the last half-century.
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See supra Part V.D.
See Appel, supra note 18, at 110.
See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1976) (“[T]his vaguely worded statute seems

designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for development of a ‘common law’ of NEPA. To
date, the courts have responded in just that manner and have created such a ‘common law.’”);
see also Blumm & Mosman, supra note 3, at 196 (explaining that because NEPA provides for
public participation in decision making, it gives the public the opportunity to challenge
government action, and often reveals other statutory violations. NEPA proponents have argued
that the statute “created a kind of common law of the environment.”).
321 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
322 See supra notes 263–69 and accompanying text.
323 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006) (“The
Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of all
components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population
growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and
expanding technological advances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring
and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, declares
that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic,
and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.”).
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